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THE FEDERAL INFORMATION SECURITY 
MANAGEMENT ACT OF 2002:  A POTEMKIN 
VILLAGE 
Daniel M. White* 
 
Due to the daunting possibilities of cyberwarfare, and the ease with 
which cyberattacks may be conducted, the United Nations has warned that 
the next world war could be initiated through worldwide cyberattacks 
between countries.  In response to the growing threat of cyberwarfare and 
the increasing importance of information security, Congress passed the 
Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 (FISMA).  FISMA 
recognizes the importance of information security to the national economic 
and security interests of the United States.  However, this Note argues that 
FISMA has failed to significantly bolster information security, primarily 
because FISMA treats information security as a technological problem and 
not an economic problem.  This Note analyzes existing proposals to 
incentivize heightened software quality assurance, and proposes a new 
solution designed to strengthen federal information security in light of the 
failings of FISMA and the trappings of Congress’s 2001 amendment to the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In early 2007, Estonia was widely considered one of the most 
technologically integrated countries in the world.1  Free public Wi-Fi 
flourished and Estonian citizens could conduct banking, file taxes, vote in 
parliamentary elections, and pay for goods through cellular phones and e-
technology.2  In April of 2007, Estonia relocated a Soviet World War II 
memorial.3  What followed was a crippling retaliatory denial-of-service 
attack on Estonian infrastructure.4  In a matter of hours, the attack blocked 
government communication, a number of online banking portals, and 
 
 1. See DAVID RICE, GEEKONOMICS:  THE REAL COST OF INSECURE SOFTWARE, at xiii 
(2008) (describing Estonia as “‘the most wired nation in Europe’ because of its pervasive use 
of computer networks for a wide array of private and public activities”); see also Jon P. 
Jurich, Cyberwar and Customary International Law:  The Potential of a “Bottom-Up” 
Approach to an International Law of Information Operations, 9 CHI. J. INT’L L. 275, 275 
(2008). 
 2. Scott J. Shackelford, From Nuclear War to Net War:  Analogizing Cyber Attacks in 
International Law, 27 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 192, 193–94 (2009). 
 3. See RICE, supra note 1, at xii. 
 4. See Jurich, supra note 1, at 275. 
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newspaper circulation.5  Estonia instantaneously spiraled into a state of 
anarchy.  Within a few days of the attack, riots and civil insurrection caused 
over 150 injuries and one death.6  As one commentator observed: 
Never before had an entire country been targeted on almost every digital 
front all at once, and never before had a government itself fought back in 
such a prolonged and well-publicized campaign.  Indeed, the attacks were 
so widespread and the results so grave that [Estonian Minister of Defense 
Jaak] Aaviksoo considered invoking Article 5 of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (“NATO”), which states that an assault on one allied 
country obligates the alliance to attack the aggressor.7 
Fortunately, Estonia was able to regain control of its domestic infrastructure 
and restore order. 8   
 While Russia was initially believed to be responsible for the attacks, the 
ensuing investigation led to much confusion over who was responsible, and 
no formal conclusion was ever reached.9  Although the Estonia incident is a 
quintessential example of the disorder and destruction a cyberattack can 
cause, it is only one of many recent instances of cyberwarfare.  Other 
documented attacks include the interruption of air traffic control systems, 
the corruption of a nuclear power plant control system in Ohio, the co-
option of gas pipelines, and the degradation of utility companies and power 
grids.10 
Cyberattacks are not limited to those on critical infrastructure.  Attacks 
can be used to gather classified intelligence and, as a Pentagon review noted 
in 2004, to exploit weaknesses in the Navy’s broadcast system used to 
communicate nuclear launch codes to Trident submarines.11  This report 
noted that potential attackers could gain access to the communications 
network and falsify launch orders, potentially leading to an errant nuclear 
weapons launch.12 
There are a number of reasons why cyberattacks are widespread.  First, a 
successful cyberattack need only exploit one weakness in a computer 
network, while a successful cyberdefense requires defending against all 
vulnerabilities.13  Additionally, most cyberattacks—such as the denial-of-
service attack waged against Estonia—can be conducted using nearly any 
 
 5. See Shackelford, supra note 2, at 193–94. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. at 194. 
 8. Id. at 206. 
 9. See Gadi Evron, Battling Botnets and Online Mobs:  Estonia’s Defense Efforts 
During the Internet War, GEO. J. INT’L AFF., Winter/Spring 2008, at 121, 123. 
 10. Jason Fritz, Hacking Nuclear Command and Control 5 (2009) (unpublished research 
paper) (on file with the International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and 
Disarmament), available at http://www.icnnd.org/research/Jason_Fritz_Hacking_NC2.pdf. 
 11. Id. at 16. 
 12. Id.  More recently, Iraqi insurgents have been using widely available software, 
purchased for twenty-six dollars, to intercept live video feeds from unmanned Predator 
Drones in Iraq. See Siobhan Gorman et al., Insurgents Hack U.S. Drones, WALL. ST. J., Dec. 
17, 2009, at A1. 
 13. See Fritz, supra note 10, at 6. 
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computer with an Internet connection.14  Attacks can be easily masked and 
present none of the logistical difficulties associated with traditional physical 
attacks.15  In short, cyberwarfare can be used in place of nearly any 
traditional form of attack or espionage, and it is often more advantageous.  
Due to the daunting possibilities of cyberwarfare, and the ease with which 
cyberattacks may be conducted, the United Nations has warned that the next 
world war could be initiated through worldwide cyberattacks among 
countries.16 
In response to the growing threat of cyberwarfare, and the increasing 
importance of information security, Congress passed the Federal 
Information Security Management Act of 2002 (FISMA).17  FISMA 
“recognized the importance of information security to the economic and 
national security interests of the United States.”18  Specifically, FISMA 
requires each federal agency to adopt and manage an agency-wide program 
to ensure information and computer network security.19  Unfortunately, 
many critics view FISMA as unsuccessful, with one commentator referring 
to it as a “paperwork drill” that “puts into place and measures paper-based 
processes, rather than technical processes, for implementing information 
security.”20  More importantly, FISMA fails to address the root cause of 
network exploitation:  inadequate software quality assurance.21 
The world has become largely dependent on software, which “helps 
deliver oil to our cities, electricity to our homes, water to our crops, 
products to our markets, money to our banks, and information to our 
minds.”22  However, software is becoming increasingly less reliable.23  This 
heightened dependence comes at a time when software and network 
exploitation are on the rise, and the Internet is rapidly becoming the new 
battlefield of the twenty-first century.  What has become clear is that 
adequate software quality assurance is of paramount concern and is critical 
to national security.  Unfortunately, Congress has compounded the problem 
of inadequate software quality assurance.  In 2001, Congress amended the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act24 to prevent the possibility of bringing an 
action against software manufacturers for negligently manufactured 
 
 14. Id. at 1. 
 15. Id. at 3. 
 16. Associated Foreign Press, Threat of Next World War May Be in Cyberspace:  UN, 
BREITBART.COM (Oct. 6, 2009, 11:47 AM), http://www.breitbart.com/
article.php?id=CNG.d8b45ac8e22de08986da7ef67ae96151.431&show_article=1. 
 17. Pub. L. No. 107-347, 116 Stat. 2899 (codified at 44 U.S.C. §§ 3541–3549 (2006)).  
 18. Nat’l. Inst. of Standards & Tech., Detailed Overview, 
http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SMA/fisma/overview.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2010). 
 19. Id. 
 20. INPUT Says FISMA Fails to Improve Overall Security, INPUT (March 16, 2006), 
http://www.input.com/corp/press/detail.cfm?news=1168. 
 21. See RICE, supra note 1, at 82–83. 
 22. See id. at 6. 
 23. Id. at xv. 
 24. Pub. L. No. 99-474, 100 Stat. 1213 (2001) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 
1030(g) (2006)). 
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software.25  Such a liability shield creates fundamental disincentives for 
software manufacturers to ensure adequate software quality assurance, and 
has imposed substantial negative externalities on the U.S. federal 
government that have decreased information security and, in turn, 
weakened national and economic security.26 
Various proposals have been made and intense debate has ensued over 
how best to incentivize software manufacturers to ensure adequate software 
quality assurance.  These proposals are generally rooted in tort theories, and 
include holding software manufacturers strictly liable for security flaws 
under products liability theory,27 as well as a new cause of action for the 
negligent enablement of cybercrimes.28  Additionally, incentive systems 
rooted in contract law have also been proposed.29 
This Note will analyze existing proposals to incentivize heightened 
software quality assurance and propose a new solution designed to 
strengthen federal information security in light of the failings of FISMA 
and the trappings of the 2001 amendment to the Computer Fraud and Abuse 
Act.  Part I of this Note examines the history, purpose, and enforcement of 
FISMA.  Part I also analyzes common criticisms of FISMA, including the 
view that FISMA has failed to significantly bolster information security, 
primarily because FISMA treats information security as a technological 
problem and not as an economic problem.  Existing proposals designed to 
incentivize heightened software quality assurance are analyzed in Part II. 
Part III of this Note argues that the most plausible method to incentivize 
heightened federal information security is to impose liability on software 
manufacturers for the breach of an express warranty.  This warranty is 
premised on a newly developed security assurance certification.  A federal 
mandate will direct agencies only to purchase commercial software 
designated with such a certification.  Finally, Part III addresses the 
advantages and disadvantages of such a mandate. 
I. THE FEDERAL INFORMATION SECURITY MANAGEMENT ACT OF 2002 
(FISMA) 
To better understand the role FISMA plays in information and network 
security, Part I.A discusses the history, purpose, and current enforcement of 
FISMA.  Part I.B examines contemporary criticisms of FISMA, and Part 
I.C highlights current efforts to revise FISMA in light of such criticism. 
 
 25. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g).  The revision states, “No action may be brought . . . for the 
negligent design or manufacture of computer hardware, computer software, or firmware.” Id. 
 26. See RICE, supra note 1, at 43–44. 
 27. See Kevin R. Pinkney, Putting Blame Where Blame is Due:  Software Manufacturer 
and Customer Liability for Security-Related Software Failure, 13 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 43, 
46–48 (2002) (proposing that software manufacturers should be subjected to strict products 
liability); see also RICE, supra note 1, at 221–32. 
 28. See generally Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, The Tort of Negligent 
Enablement of Cybercrime, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1553 (2005).  For additional 
commentary on Rustad & Koenig’s proposal, see RICE, supra note 1, at 232–36; infra Part 
II.B. 
 29. See infra Part II.C. 
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A. The History, Purposes, and Enforcement of FISMA 
Information security has a long and intriguing history.  One well-known 
example is that of Histaiaeus, a tyrant under the Persian king Darius.30  
Histaiaeus tattooed the shaved head of his slave with a message urging the 
ruler of Miletus to revolt against King Darius.31  Histaiaeus waited for the 
slave’s hair to grow back before he sent the slave to the ruler of Miletus.32  
While primitive, the arrangement allowed the slave to travel 
inconspicuously to the intended recipient and ensure the message’s safe 
delivery.  Countless examples abound throughout history of wars won and 
lost due to superior—or inferior—information security.33 
The rapid growth of computing technology and the Internet has presented 
new challenges to safeguarding information and critical infrastructure.34  
Cyberattacks and exploitations have further fueled the need for superior 
information security.35  Beginning in the 1980s, Congress addressed 
electronic information security through a number of legislative schemes 
designed to deal with the management and disposition of records, the 
management of information resources, and a number of other relevant 
concerns.36  These efforts manifested themselves in the Paperwork 
Reduction Act of 1980,37 the Counterfeit Access Device and Computer 
Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984,38 and the Computer Security Act of 1987,39 
among others.40 
FISMA was designed to consolidate the latter statutes41 and was signed 
into law as Title III of the E-Government Act of 2002.42  FISMA’s stated 
 
 30. See SIMON SINGH, THE CODE BOOK:  THE SCIENCE OF SECRECY FROM ANCIENT EGYPT 
TO QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY 5 (1999). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. See generally id. (discussing the influence of information security—specifically, 
cryptography—from Ancient Egypt through World Wars I and II). 
 34. See Shackelford, supra note 2, at 193–94.  As noted, the attack on Estonia is the 
quintessential example of the new challenges the Internet poses to information security.  
Never before has a country’s infrastructure been so compromised exclusively because of its 
connectivity to the Internet. Id.; see also supra notes 1–7 and accompanying text.  For a brief 
overview of the challenges the Internet poses to safeguarding information and critical 
infrastructure, see Fritz, supra note 10, at 5. 
 35. See supra notes 1–12 and accompanying text. 
 36. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 107-787, pt. 1, at 54–55 (2002), reprinted in 2002 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1880, 1889 (including the authorized use or disclosure of information with 
regard to the protection of personal privacy, and the disclosure of information to the 
Congress or the Comptroller General of the United States). 
 37. Pub. L. No. 96-511, 94 Stat. 2812 (codified at 44 U.S.C. § 3501 (2006)). 
 38. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2190 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2006)).   
 39. Pub. L. No. 100-235, 101 Stat. 1724 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 272 (2006)).  
 40. See, e.g., The Government Information Security Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 106-398, 
114 Stat. 1654 (2000) (codified at 40 U.S.C. § 11103(a) (2006)); The Information 
Technology Management Reform (Clinger-Cohen) Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-106, §§ 
5001–02, 110 Stat. 679, 679–80 (codified at 40 U.S.C. § 1401 (2006)). 
 41. See H.R. REP. NO. 107-787, pt.1, at 54, reprinted in 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1880–89 
(“FISMA eliminates obsolete mandates, updates outmoded provisions, harmonizes 
overlapping requirements, and strengthens key requirements.  The result is a clearer and 
stronger law. . . .”). 
 42. 44 U.S.C. §§ 3541–3549 (2006). 
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purpose is to provide effective information security management and 
oversight for the federal government.43  In doing so, FISMA recognizes the 
importance of information security to the United States’ national and 
economic security.44 
To accomplish its stated purposes, FISMA requires each federal agency 
to adopt, manage, and document an agencywide program to ensure 
information security.45  Federal agencies are directed to utilize a risk-based 
approach to information security, which consists of each respective agency 
adopting security measures as required by the classification given to the 
relative worth of agency information.46  This approach is designed to 
reduce security risks to an acceptable level in a cost-effective manner and 
ensure that information security is maintained throughout the life cycle of 
the organizational information system.47 
Once a proper security level has been determined, agencies are instructed 
to implement and maintain information security policies and procedures 
 
 43. See id. § 3541.  The Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 
(FISMA) has six purported purposes, to: 
(1) [P]rovide a comprehensive framework for ensuring the effectiveness of 
information security controls over information resources that support Federal 
operations and assets; 
(2) [R]ecognize the highly networked nature of the current Federal computing 
environment and provide effective governmentwide management and oversight of 
the related information security risks, including coordination of information 
security efforts throughout the civilian, national security, and law enforcement 
communities; 
(3) [P]rovide for development and maintenance of minimum controls required to 
protect Federal information and information systems; 
(4) [P]rovide a mechanism for improved oversight of Federal agency information 
security programs; 
(5) [A]cknowledge that commercially developed information security products 
offer advanced, dynamic, robust, and effective information security solutions, 
reflecting market solutions for the protection of critical information infrastructures 
important to the national defense and economic security of the nation that are 
designed, built, and operated by the private sector; and 
(6) [R]ecognize that the selection of specific technical hardware and software 
information security solutions should be left to individual agencies from among 
commercially developed products. 
Id. 
 44. See H.R. REP. NO. 107-787, pt.1, at 55–60, reprinted in 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1880, 
1889–94; see also NAT’L. INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., FIPS PUBLICATION 200:  MINIMUM 
SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR FEDERAL INFORMATION AND INFORMATION 
SYSTEMS iv (2006) [hereinafter FIPS REPORT], available at 
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips200/FIPS-200-final-march.pdf; Nat’l. Inst. of 
Standards & Tech, NIST.GOV, http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SMA/fisma/overview.html (last 
visited Sept. 23, 2010). 
 45. See 44 U.S.C. § 3544(b) (“Each agency shall develop, document, and implement an 
agencywide information security program . . . .”). 
 46. See id. § 3543.  The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) requires 
agencies to categorize their information systems as “low-impact, moderate-impact, or high-
impact for the security objectives of confidentiality, integrity, and availability.  The potential 
impact values assigned to the respective security objectives are the highest values . . . from 
among the security categories that have been determined for each type of information 
resident on those information systems.” FIPS Report, supra note 44, at 1. 
 47. See 44 U.S.C. § 3544(b)(2)(B)–(C). 
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consistent with the National Institute of Standards and Technology’s 
(NIST) technological requirements.48  This includes “periodically testing 
and evaluating information security controls and techniques to ensure that 
they are effectively implemented.”49  FISMA entrusts the head of each 
agency with the ultimate responsibility of testing and ensuring agency 
compliance with FISMA.50  However, the head of each agency may 
delegate this responsibility to a Chief Information Officer (CIO).51 
To adequately govern agency heads and ensure compliance, FISMA 
empowers the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) with management 
authority over federal agencies’ information security systems.52  This 
authority includes the ability to approve or disapprove of any federal 
agency’s information security system.53  Ultimately, OMB is required to 
report to a number of oversight authorities, including science and 
technology committees and appropriations committees before both the 
House of Representatives and the Senate.54  Reports consist of annual 
evaluations,55 an “assessment of the development, promulgation, and 
adoption of, and compliance with, standards developed [under] the National 
Institute of Standards and Technology Act,”56 as well as deficiencies in 
agency practices,57 and remedial plans designed to remedy such 
deficiencies.58  Finally, Congress has empowered OMB to ensure 
compliance with FISMA through sanctions imposed for non-compliance.59  
This includes the ability to recommend reducing agency budgets or 
appropriations for information resources.60 
Consequently, FISMA requires the establishment of, and compliance 
with, adequate information security standards.  The result is an 
 
 48. See id. § 3544(a)(1)(B)(i).  NIST is instructed to “develop standards and guidelines, 
including minimum requirements, for providing adequate information security for all agency 
operations and assets . . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 278g-3(a)(3) (2006).  It is important to note that 
these standards do not apply to select, highly classified systems run by agencies such as the 
Central Intelligence Agency or Department of Defense. See id. 
 49. 44 U.S.C. § 3544(a)(2)(D).  The frequency of this testing is based on the designated 
categorization of the information system.  For example, information systems deemed “high-
impact” are tested more frequently than information systems deemed “low-impact.” See id. § 
3544(b)(5). 
 50. Id. § 3544(a). 
 51. Id. § 3544(a)(3). 
 52. Id. § 3543(a). 
 53. Id. § 3543(a)(5). 
 54. Id. § 3544(c) (specifically, the Office of Management & Budget (OMB) is required 
to report to the “Committees on Government Reform and Science of the House of 
Representatives, the Committees on Governmental Affairs and Commerce, Science, and 
Transportation of the Senate, the appropriate authorization and appropriations committees of 
Congress, and the Comptroller General . . . .”). 
 55. See id. § 3543(a)(8)(A).  An Inspector General or an external auditor performs the 
evaluation. See id. § 3545(b).  The evaluation is designed to test “the effectiveness of 
information security policies, procedures, and practices of a representative subset of the 
agency’s information systems.” Id. § 3545(a)(2)(A). 
 56. Id. § 3543(a)(8)(B). 
 57. Id. §3543(a)(8)(C). 
 58. Id. §3543(a)(8)(D). 
 59. See id. §3543(a)(4). 
 60. 40 U.S.C. § 11303(b)(5)(B). 
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encompassing, multi-layered framework for ensuring federal information 
security.  However, FISMA has been subject to substantial criticism on a 
variety of grounds.  Part I.B examines these contemporary criticisms of 
FISMA. 
B. Contemporary Criticisms of FISMA 
Contemporary criticisms of FISMA all share the same conclusion:  
FISMA fails to bolster actual information security.  This conclusion was 
supported by a Department of Homeland Security report, which found that 
cyberattacks within federal agencies increased over 250% between 2007 
and 2009.61  This section analyzes three of the more established theories 
that attempt to explain why FISMA fails to bolster actual information 
security.  Part I.B.1 explains the charge that FISMA is difficult to 
implement.  Part I.B.2 highlights the criticism that FISMA is over-reliant on 
reporting requirements that misrepresent actual security.  Part I.B.3 
analyzes the accusation that FISMA treats information security as a 
technological problem instead of an economic problem. 
1. Federal Agencies Have Difficulty Implementing FISMA 
In early 2007, an external hard drive containing Social Security numbers, 
unencrypted names, birthdates, and healthcare files of 198,000 veterans was 
stolen from the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs.62  Some of the 
veterans whose personal information had been stolen sued, seeking 
declaratory and injunctive relief premised on alleged violations of 
FISMA,63 among others.64  While the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
 
 61. See Gregg Carlstrom, Net Attacks Triple in 2 Years, FED. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2009), 
http://www.federaltimes.com/article/20090803/IT01/908030305/1035/IT01. It is important 
to note that this is a conservative estimate, since it is believed that federal agencies only 
report fifty to sixty percent of cyberattacks, and the overall figure excludes the Department 
of Defense, which “receives millions of scans and probes each year.” Id.  This is supported 
by testimony before the U.S. Senate. See Information Security:  Progress Reported, but 
Weaknesses at Federal Agencies Persist:  Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. on Fed. Fin. 
Mgmt., Gov’t Info., Fed. Servs., & Int’l Sec., Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental 
Affairs, 110th Cong. 15–16 (2008) [hereinafter Weaknesses Hearing](statement of Gregory 
C. Wilshusen, Director, Information Security Issues at the Government Accounting Office) 
(“[F]ive IGs [Inspector Generals] noted that the agency was not following procedures for 
internal incident reporting, two noted that their agency was not following reporting 
procedures to [the United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team], and one noted that 
the agency was not following reporting procedures to law enforcement.  Several IGs also 
noted specific weaknesses in incident procedures such as components not reporting incidents 
reliably or consistently, components not keeping records of incidents, and incomplete or 
inaccurate incident reports.”). 
 62. See Fanin v. U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 572 F.3d 868, 870–71 (11th Cir. 2009). 
Judge Carnes’s description of the event is particularly humorous: 
Someone pulled off the trick of making an object disappear from a safe in a 
darkened office building over a cold and rainy weekend.  Unfortunately, the 
magician never completed the trick by making it reappear . . . .  Where it is now is 
anybody’s guess. In the meantime, no one is applauding the trick, least of all the 
veterans.  Some of them have sued the VA. 
Id. at 870. 
 63. Id. at 871. 
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Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s decision to grant summary 
judgment to the defendants, and ultimately remanded the case, the decision 
contains an insightful glimpse into a federal agency’s failed compliance 
with FISMA.65  The court noted that, after the security breach had occurred, 
“[t]he Office of the Inspector General concluded that the VA’s [Veterans 
Affair’s] security plan did not comply with the agency’s own rules for 
securing data, and it improperly allowed the IT [Information Technology] 
Specialist access to databases” beyond his security clearance.66  
Furthermore, the court found that it had “no reason to think that all of the 
alleged violations have been remedied.”67  Thus, the theft of valuable 
information from the VA confirmed what a number of critics had already 
believed:  federal agencies struggle to properly implement FISMA.68  
Several theories have been promulgated to explain this struggle.69 
One theory holds that FISMA presents an unfunded mandate that 
requires agencies to perform additional work within the constraints of a pre-
existing budget.70  As one author explains, “[f]or bureaus that already 
 
 64. Id.  The complaint also alleged violations of the Privacy Act, the E-Government Act 
of 2002, the VA Claims Confidentiality Statute, the Trade Secrets Act, and the Veterans 
Benefits, Health Care, and Information Technology Act of 2006. Id. 
 65. Id. at 871, 876–78. 
 66. Id. at 871. 
 67. Id. at 876.  Nearly a year after the data theft, Robert T. Howard, the Assistant 
Secretary for Information and Technology, spoke before a Senate subcommittee.  Howard 
stated that the day the hard drive was stolen was “a wake up call . . . .  As a result of that 
incident we began to improve our security posture and create the environment needed to 
better protect the . . . sensitive information entrusted to us.” Agencies in Peril:  Are We 
Doing Enough to Protect Federal IT and Secure Sensitive Information?:  Hearing Before the 
S. Subcomm. on Fed. Fin. Mgmt., Gov’t, Info., Fed. Servs., and Int’l Sec., 110th Cong. 1 
(2008) [hereinafter Agencies in Peril] (statement of Robert T. Howard, Assistant Secretary 
for Information & Technology, Department of Veteran Affairs).  Howard proceeded to 
identify five areas of FISMA compliance the Department of Veteran Affairs is working to 
improve. Id. at 4–6.  Unfortunately, according to the 2008 OMB report to Congress, when 
asked whether the agency applies common security configurations established by NIST to 
application information systems, the Department of Veteran Affairs responded only 
“[s]ometimes (51–70% of the time).” OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, FISCAL YEAR 2008 
REPORT TO CONGRESS ON IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FEDERAL INFORMATION SECURITY 
MANAGEMENT ACT OF 2002 app. A-104 (2008) [hereinafter 2008 OMB REPORT]. 
 68. See Robert Silvers, Note, Rethinking FISMA and Federal Information Security 
Policy, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1844, 1849–63 (2006).  Silvers’ discussion of Cobell v. Norton, 
394 F. Supp. 2d 164 (D.D.C. 2005), is particularly enlightening. See Silvers, supra, at 1851–
53. In Cobell, Individual Indian Money Trust beneficiaries sought an injunction to 
disconnect the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) information technology networks from the 
Internet.  The plaintiffs alleged that the BIA lacked adequate information security, and 
therefore was in breach of its fiduciary obligations to the plaintiffs. Cobell, 394 F. Supp. 2d 
at 165–68.  Ultimately, the court’s opinion exposed a federal agency whose FISMA 
compliance had “lagged behind the expansion of the department’s Internet presence.” Id. at 
223.  For a further example of an agency’s struggle to implement FISMA, see Agencies in 
Peril, supra note 67, at 4 (statement of Robert T. Howard, Assistant Secretary for 
Information & Technology, Department of Veteran Affairs) (“While we have made progress, 
there is still much to be done.  With respect to FISMA, there are five problematic areas.”), 
and see generally 2008 OMB REPORT, supra note 67 (demonstrating numerous areas of non-
compliance despite agencies having had over six years to enact FISMA-compliant policies). 
 69. See infra notes 70–83 and accompanying text. 
 70. See Silvers , supra note 68, at 1859. 
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consider themselves strapped for cash, these new tasks may foster 
reluctance towards implementation, and perhaps even resentment aimed at 
those ordering the new work to be performed.”71 
Another theory holds that FISMA is too vague to ensure adequate 
information security.72  For example, federal agencies are required to 
ensure that private contractors comply with various provisions of FISMA.73  
However, the actual scope of this requirement is vague, and leaves 
Inspector Generals guessing whether Congress intended FISMA oversight 
of private contractors in a number of situations.74  Vagueness is also said to 
plague OMB’s guidance regarding FISMA compliance75 and the language 
and clarity of actual NIST technological standards.76  These ambiguities are 
compounded because FISMA provides no formal mechanism for resolving 
uncertainty.77  This can lead to “months (or longer) of inaction as 
bureaucrats and lawyers at various levels of an agency struggle to interpret 
a technical statutory scheme with which they may have little familiarity.”78 
Finally, many believe that agencies struggle to implement FISMA 
because FISMA fails to instill proper accountability within agencies.79  
 
 71. Id.  To support this view, Silvers cites the testimony of Earl E. Devaney, Inspector 
General of the Department of Interior, who stated before a Senate Congressional Committee 
that he viewed FISMA as “sort of an unfunded mandate that IGs [implement FISMA] 
without the resources to accompany it.” Id. 
 72. See CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUDIES, SECURING CYBERSPACE FOR THE 44TH 
PRESIDENCY 69 (2008) [hereinafter CSIS], available at 
http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/081208_securingcyberspace_44.pdf; infra notes 74–78 
and accompanying text.  Perhaps the most telling pieces of evidence that FISMA is overly 
vague is the success of consulting firms that now specialize in FISMA compliance.  As one 
FISMA consulting firm boldly asserts, “Information Security and Privacy regulations are 
purposely vague to ensure they cover a wide range of organizations over a long period of 
time without having to be amended by Congress.”  NETIQ, NETIQ FISMA COMPLIANCE & 
RISK MANAGEMENT SOLUTIONS 2 (2005), available at 
http://download.netiq.com/CMS/SOLUTIONSHEET/FISMA_broch_final_.pdf. 
 73. 44 U.S.C. § 3544(a)(1)(A)(ii) (2006). 
 74. See Silvers, supra note 68, at 1853 (“In some instances, FISMA’s applicability is 
clear.  For example, a third party who creates and maintains an information system for 
handling federal data would certainly fall within the framework of FISMA.  But in situations 
where data originating from a federal agency is merely stored on a preexisting third-party 
system as part of a standard business arrangement, it is unclear as a matter of statutory 
interpretation whether Congress meant FISMA to apply.”). 
 75. See Protecting Personal Information:  Is the Federal Government Doing Enough?:  
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 110th Cong. 5 
(2008) [hereinafter Personal Information Hearing] (statement of Ari Schwartz, Vice 
President of the Center for Democracy & Technology).  Schwartz testified that with respect 
to a specific NIST requirement, the wide variation in compliance was attributed to vague 
guidance from OMB. Id.  
 76. See Weaknesses Hearing, supra note 61, at 14–15 (statement of Gregory C. 
Wilshusen Director, Information Security Issues, Government Accounting Office) (“Twenty-
three of the major federal agencies reported that they had an agencywide security 
configuration policy.  Although the IGs agreed that their agency had such a policy, several 
IGs did not agree to the extent to which their agencies . . . applied the common security 
configurations as established by NIST.”). 
 77. See Silvers, supra note 68, at 1853. 
 78. Id. 
 79. See infra notes 80–82 and accompanying text. 
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FISMA empowers the OMB to ensure compliance with FISMA through the 
threat of a number of sanctions, including the ability to recommend 
reducing agency budgets or appropriations for information resources.80  
However, as one critic argues, IT sanctions are counterproductive81 and “so 
many agencies are delinquent in their FISMA obligations that a ‘safety in 
numbers’ mentality may begin to take hold . . . the current environment—in 
which nearly every major federal agency has work left to do—would make 
mass punishment . . . disastrous.”82  This belief is further supported by 
agencies’ inability to meet all of FISMA’s obligations after six years of 
working to ensure FISMA compliance.83 
2. FISMA Is a “Paperwork Exercise” 
As explained in the previous section, the composition of FISMA impedes 
federal agencies from implementing compliant policies.  However, even 
assuming one hundred percent compliance with FISMA, many 
commentators believe that FISMA would still fail to bolster actual 
information security.84  While FISMA requires federal agencies to ensure 
that their information security systems are compliant with NIST 
technological standards,85 a substantial portion of FISMA compliance 
revolves around reporting requirements.86  Critics believe there are two 
fundamental flaws with these reporting requirements that ultimately work to 
undermine actual information security.87 
The first flaw critics point to with respect to FISMA reporting 
requirements are the metrics being measured and reported.88  This argument 
theorizes that the metrics used as a basis for FISMA reporting do not 
actually measure operational security.89  The key measurements FISMA 
requires, such as certification and accreditation, plan of action and 
milestones (POA&M), and percentage of personnel trained, cover the 
“[p]eople, [p]rocess and [t]echnology aspects of security” but fail to 
 
 80. See supra notes 59–60 and accompanying text. 
 81. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
 82. See Silvers, supra note 68, at 1862 (internal citation omitted). 
 83. See generally 2008 OMB REPORT, supra note 67 (demonstrating numerous areas of 
non-compliance despite agencies having had over six years to enact FISMA-compliant 
policies). 
 84. See infra notes 87–103 and accompanying text. 
 85. See 44 U.S.C. § 3544(a)(1)(B)(i) (2002). 
 86. See id. § 3544(c); supra notes 54–60 and accompanying text. 
 87. See Wm. Arthur Conklin, Why FISMA Falls Short:  The Need for Security Metrics, 
41 WIRELESS INTERNET S. PROVIDER PROC. 1, 1–8 (2008), http://www.tech.uh.edu/cae-
dc/documents/WISP%202007%20FISMA%20metrics%20paper%20final.pdf; see also 
Agencies in Peril, supra note 67, at 2–6 (statement of Tim Bennett, President of Cyber 
Security Industry Alliance) (identifying general flaws in FISMA reporting); Angela Gunn, 
Fed Having Fits over FISMA and Cybersecurity, BETANEWS (Dec. 12, 2008), 
 http://www.betanews.com/article/Feds-having-fits-over-FISMA-and 
cybersecurity/1229078893. 
 88. See Conklin, supra note 87, at 8–9; see also Agencies in Peril, supra note 67, at 3 
(statement of Tim Bennett, President of Cyber Security Industry Alliance). 
 89. See Conklin, supra note 87, at 8–9. 
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“directly assess aspects of operational security.”90  These critics claim the 
metrics do not evaluate the underlying effectiveness of a federal agency’s 
security system, or any specific aspect of a system’s operational security.91  
Moreover, FISMA reporting requirements do not evaluate relative threat 
levels, or potential vulnerabilities associated with a system.92 
Testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Federal Financial 
Management, Government Information, Federal Services, and International 
Security aided the belief that FISMA focuses too heavily on compliance at 
the expense of actual security.93  Tim Bennett, President of the Cyber 
Security Industry Alliance, lamented how FISMA grades reflect how well 
agencies comply with FISMA-mandated processes, but not how well these 
processes have actually increased federal information security.94  He 
concluded that federal agencies are relying on misleading data to bolster 
their information security.95 
To compound this problem, critics have identified a second flaw in 
FISMA reporting requirements:  FISMA provides little incentive to address 
any metric outside of those required by FISMA reporting requirements.96  
Critics argue that these reporting requirements 
create[] lots of paperwork . . . . By focusing on security reports and the 
auditing thereof rather than on actual security measures . . . FISMA made 
it easy for federal [Chief Information Security Officers] to quantify their 
work in a way the bureaucracy at large could understand.  Rather than 
trying to demonstrate that their systems prevented X number of attacks or 
deflected Y number of intrusions . . . departments could demonstrate that 
 
 90. Id. at 8.  Conklin provides a useful description of each key FISMA metric and what 
the metric is used to measure; accordingly:   
Certification and Accreditation measures efforts at defining the appropriate 
security measures on a system by system basis.  The . . . POA&M [Plan of Action 
and Milestones] metric measures the compliance with an established methodology 
for correction of discrepancies.  The measurement of percentage of personnel 
trained is an attempt to determine the commitment towards training and awareness. 
Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. See Agencies in Peril, supra note 67, at 3 (statement of Tim Bennett, President of 
Cyber Security Industry Alliance). 
 94. Id. at 2; see also Jaikumar Vijayan, Critics Question Value of Federal IT Security 
Report Card, IDG NEWS SERV. (May 25, 2008), 
http://news.idg.no/cw/art.cfm?id=08F0A29C-17A4-0F78-3113197D5C06A6C5 (“The 
current FISMA reports ‘say absolutely nothing about government security,’ said Alan Paller, 
director of research at the SANS Institute, a Bethesda, Maryland based IT training and 
certification organization.  ‘This is just a measure of compliance with report generation.’ . . . 
Ironically, he added, some agencies that are making an effort to comply with the true intent 
of the 396-page FISMA requirements document are getting poor grades on the annual report 
card, while others that have treated the process as a mere paperwork exercise are getting 
good grades.”). 
 95. See Conklin, supra note 87, at 8–9. 
 96. See Gunn, supra note 87; see also Agencies in Peril, supra note 67, at 3 (statement 
of Tim Bennett, President of Cyber Security Industry Alliance). 
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they’d reached their proper level of FISMA compliance . . . and thereby 
justify their various budgets.97 
According to critics, FISMA relies too heavily on an agency’s compliance 
with FISMA’s reporting requirements as a means of objectively measuring 
the agency’s level of information security.98  This in turn motivates Chief 
Information Security Officers to comply only with reporting requirements 
and ignore underlying information security threats.99  Tim Bennett provided 
support to this argument when he explained in his Congressional testimony 
that some Chief Information Security Officers’ performances are measured 
on their respective abilities to comply with FISMA reporting requirements, 
and not whether they have “adequately assessed risk in their respective 
agency or prevented breaches of sensitive information.”100 
Thus, the two flaws identified by critics101 support the general criticism 
that the information security assurances FISMA attempts to guarantee 
through oversight and reporting102 are undermined by the nature of the 
compliance, oversight, and reporting processes.103  To many, this explains 
why cyberattacks within federal agencies increased over 250% between 
2007 and 2009.104 
 
 97. See Gunn, supra note 87. 
 98. See id. 
 99. See Agencies in Peril, supra note 67, at 3 (statement of Tim Bennett, President of 
Cyber Security Industry Alliance); see also Vijayan, supra note 94 (“[Director Paller noted] 
‘First, Congress creates waste by writing FISMA in a way that demands useless reporting, 
and then it highlights the useless scores in a way that in some cases provides incentives for 
federal agencies to deliver misleading results.’”). 
 100. See Agencies in Peril, supra note 67, at 3. 
 101. See supra notes 88–100 and accompanying text. 
 102. 44 U.S.C. § 3544(c) (2002); see supra notes 54–60 and accompanying text. 
 103. See supra notes 88–100 and accompanying text.  Interestingly, many commentators 
feel that FISMA was not designed nor intended to promote actual operational information 
security, but rather merely to promote awareness within the federal government about the 
risks cyberattacks pose. See Conklin, supra note 87, at 8 (“FISMA was intended to introduce 
information security practices to the Federal government sector and agencies, not to provide 
a complete and comprehensive solution.”).  Tim Bennett does not explicitly endorse this 
view, but recognizes the importance FISMA plays in raising federal information security 
awareness.  See Agencies in Peril, supra note 67, at 2 (statement of Tim Bennett, President 
of Cyber Security Industry Alliance) (“FISMA has been fairly successful in getting agencies 
in general to pay closer attention to their information security obligations.  Before FISMA, 
information security was not a top priority at federal agencies.  FISMA has been successful 
in raising awareness of information security . . . .”). 
 104. See Carlstrom, supra note 61; see also Conklin, supra note 87, at 9 (“The recent 
spate of recurring data disclosures and highly publicized information security failures in 
Federal agencies highlight the limitations of the current FISMA based approach. . . .  The 
fact that . . . some agencies have not had an information security failure may [be] due as 
much to luck or lack of knowledge as it is to proper information security management.”). 
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3. FISMA Treats Information Security as a Technological Problem and Not 
an Economic Problem 
According to the National Vulnerability Database (NVD), there are 
approximately 40,000 known software vulnerabilities105 that can be 
exploited to gain remote access to a computer or network.106  The NVD 
currently adds, on average, eleven new vulnerabilities each day.107  Some 
commentators feel that the most significant failing of FISMA—as opposed 
to the compliance or reporting issues addressed in the previous sections—
lies in its complete failure to address negligent software development.108  
The results, according to critics, are “advanced, dynamic, robust, and 
effective information security solutions”109 marred with known software 
vulnerabilities FISMA cannot even begin to solve.110  To better understand 
the criticism being levied, this section first discusses the nature of the 
software industry, and then examines the specific criticism that FISMA and 
NIST treat information security as a technological problem, when 
information security should instead be approached as an economic 
problem.111 
a. Software Manufacturers, Liability Shields, and Externalities 
It is important to note that the U.S. federal government is the single 
largest purchaser of information security products.112  These products, 
manufactured by civilian software companies, are the same products 
designed to safeguard federal agencies from external intrusions and 
exploitations.113  Thus, software quality assurance becomes exceedingly 
 
 105. NATIONAL VULNERABILITY DATABASE, http://nvd.nist.gov/ (last visited Sept. 23, 
2010).  The National Vulnerability Database (NVD) describes itself as “a product of the 
NIST Computer Security Division and is sponsored by the Department of Homeland 
Security’s National Cyber Security Division.  It supports the U.S. government multi-agency  
. . . Information Security Automation Program.  It is the U.S. government content repository 
for the Security Content Automation Protocol (SCAP).” Id.  Its mission is to enable 
“automation of vulnerability management, security measurement, and compliance (e.g. 
FISMA).” Id.  
 106. See Weaknesses Hearing, supra note 61, at 7 (statement of Gregory C. Wilshusen 
Director, Information Security Issues at the Government Accounting Office). 
 107. See NATIONAL VULNERABILITY DATABASE, supra note 105; see also JOHN ROLLINS & 
ANNA C. HENNING, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40427, COMPREHENSIVE NATIONAL 
CYBERSECURITY INITIATIVE:  LEGAL AUTHORITIES AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 3 (2009), 
available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R40427.pdf (finding that software and 
network exploitation is increasing). 
 108. See RICE, supra note 1, at 285–88. 
 109. Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002, 44 U.S.C. § 3541(5) (2006). 
 110. See RICE, supra note 1, at 286. 
 111. See id. at xvi (“Protecting economic and national security from the effects of 
insecure software is as much an economic issue as it is a technological issue.”). 
 112. See CSIS, supra note 72, at 56. 
 113. 44 U.S.C. § 3541 (stating that one of the purposes of FISMA is to “recognize that 
the selection of specific technical hardware and software information security solutions 
should be left to individual agencies from among commercially developed products”). 
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important when framed in terms of information security.114  Many believe 
this concern only exists theoretically, highlighting that “[n]inety percent of 
security threats exploit known flaws in software.”115  This is because 
software engineering practices are influenced by a first-to-market mentality 
that emphasizes speed over quality, and encourages programmers to ignore 
serious errors and instead develop software as quickly as possible.116 
To succeed in the software industry, as in most industries, a company 
must differentiate itself from the competition.  However, given the fluid 
nature of the technology industry, and the reliance on cash flow to support 
operations, software manufacturers face increased pressure to rush their 
products to market in order to better capitalize on the product’s 
innovation.117  This leads to cost-cutting measures, such as the elimination 
of testing processes designed to ensure adequate quality assurance, which is 
traditionally one of the more expensive phases of development.118  Thus, 
the inherent nature of the technology industry is said to provide a 
disincentive to thoroughly test software for known defects before releasing 
the product into the open marketplace.119  This disincentive is 
supplemented, and some commentators say aided, by the liability shield 
imparted on the technology industry by Congress and the courts.120 
 
 114. See RICE, supra note 1, at 43–44 (“The real cost of insecure software is . . . cyber 
crime, insufficient testing, lost productivity, economic losses . . . and sometimes even death . 
. . . It is becoming more and more apparent . . . that the real cost of insecure software lies in 
what we are giving up—national and economic security.”). 
 115. See id. at 133.  But see Pinkney, supra note 27, at 66 (“Most telling though, is 
CERT’s finding that over ninety-five percent of intrusions use known vulnerabilities for 
which counter-measures are available.”).  Some of the most common software vulnerabilities 
include password detection, buffer overflow, and denial of service attacks.  For a 
comprehensive explanation of these attacks, see id. at 51–59. 
 116. See Jonathan Jacky, Safety-Critical Computing:  Hazards, Practices, Standards, and 
Regulation (1994), reprinted in COMPUTERIZATION AND CONTROVERSY:  VALUE CONFLICTS & 
SOCIAL CHOICES 767–92 (Rob Kling ed., 1996), available at 
http://staff.washington.edu/jon/pubs/safety-critical.html. 
 117. See RICE, supra note 1, at 44; Pinkney, supra note 27, at 72–73 (“Software 
manufacturers are eager to reduce time to market.  Some manufacturers who otherwise might 
take due care preventing security-related software failure are forced under a no liability rule 
to lower their standard of care in order to compete with manufacturers not taking due care.”).  
Thus, the software industry model functionally creates a “race to the bottom” in terms of 
software quality assurance. 
 118. See RICE, supra note 1, at 45. 
 119. See Pinkney, supra note 27, at 67–68 (“Software is rushed to market and shipped 
with default configurations that disable security features.  Such software is replete with 
foreseeable vulnerabilities (e.g., buffer overflows, cross-site scripting, or unexpected 
operator attacks) because it trusts user input without testing to see whether the input is 
trustworthy.  Even after many years and thousands of examples, software manufacturers still 
offer programs destined for security-related software failure.”); Rustad & Koenig, supra note 
28, at 1556. 
 120. See infra notes 121–27 and accompanying text.  Rustad & Koenig explain the recent 
history of the courts’ attitudes towards software manufacturers’ use of adhesion contracts, 
stating: 
Prior to the mid-1990s, U.S. courts were reluctant to enforce adhesion contracts in 
the form of software agreements.  However, the courts’ attitudes have since 
changed in favor of broad enforceability of mass market license agreements; the 
2010] A POTEMKIN VILLAGE 385 
Consumers face numerous obstacles when pursuing potential remedies 
against software manufacturers.  Software manufacturers traditionally use 
adhesion contracts,121 making any remedy rooted in contract law 
significantly more difficult to attain.122  Moreover, these contracts merely 
“license” the intellectual property of the underlying software, and at no 
point is the ownership of the software actually sold to the consumer.123  
Additionally, there is currently no defined standard of care for software 
manufacturers.124  Without a standard of care, tort remedies are largely 
foreclosed.125  In 2001, Congress amended the Computer Fraud and Abuse 
Act to prevent the possibility of bringing an action against software 
manufacturers for negligently manufactured software.126  Without 
meaningful contract or tort remedies, “despite an epidemic of computer 
security flaws, no plaintiff has recovered damages for cyber crimes enabled 
by flawed software under any legal theory.”127 
Critics maintain that, as a consequence of the fundamental disincentives 
software manufacturers have to ensure adequate quality assurance, 
substantial negative externalities128 have been imposed upon consumers, 
 
current trend is to enforce one-sided software agreements so long as the user has 
an opportunity to review and manifest assent to the terms. 
Rustad & Koenig, supra note 28, at 1565. 
 121. See RICE, supra note 1, at 180–83.  Rice describes how software adhesion contracts 
absolve software manufacturers of responsibility and accountability. Id. at 183. 
 122. See infra note 127. 
 123. See Rustad & Koenig, supra note 28, at 1562–67.  The typical software industry 
shrinkwrap contract creates a “reverse unilateral contract.” Id. at 1563.  This contract 
typically disclaims any meaningful warranties, and makes litigation exponentially more 
difficult through unfavorable choice of law and forum selection clauses. Id. at 1564.  As 
Rustad and Koenig explain, “[v]ery few consumers are even aware that they waive their 
implied warranty of merchantability, surrender their right to file suit in a court of law, and 
agree to submit to arbitration in a distant forum by the mere act of clicking on an icon 
labeled ‘I agree.’” Id. at 1564; see RICE, supra note 1, at 181. 
 124. See RICE, supra note 1, at 184. 
 125. Id. (observing that “a claim for damages against a non-existent standard is 
impossible”); see Pinkney, supra note 27, at 46–47 (“A number of legal doctrines have 
constrained the market as well, at least historically.  Several doctrines under the UCC 
coalesced to prevent effective contracting over liability for software failure.  Furthermore, 
the common law disallowed recovery for the economic losses typical of software failure 
suits.”). 
 126. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g) (2006).  The revision states, “No action may be brought . . . for 
the negligent design or manufacture of computer hardware, computer software, or 
firmware.” Id.  This revision was largely a response to several court decisions that expanded 
the scope of the existing Computer Fraud and Abuse Act to extend to market transactions, 
resulting in several software manufacturers being found liable for damages caused by 
vulnerabilities found in negligently manufactured software. See Pinkney, supra note 27, at 
65; see also Shaw v. Toshiba Am. Info. Sys., Inc., 91 F. Supp. 2d 926 (E.D. Tex. 1999) 
(finding liability for the sale of floppy disk controllers containing faulty code). 
 127. RICE, supra note 1, at 184. 
 128. Externalities exist when self-interest prohibits the consequences of a particular 
course of action from being internalized by an actor because the consequences fall on 
another.  See DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 42 (6th ed. 2006).  As David Rice explains, 
“Self-interest often wins over self-correction no matter how sublime or frivolous self-interest 
might be.  In the story of software, then, the relationship between self-interest, incentives, 
and market failure is significant.”  RICE, supra note 1, at 42. 
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including the U.S. federal government.129  In the context of inadequate 
software quality assurance, commentators believe that these externalities 
decrease information security, and in turn, weaken national and economic 
security.130 
b. FISMA & NIST’s Reluctance to Embrace Liability 
Recall that NIST was established for the purpose of “develop[ing] 
standards and guidelines, including minimum requirements, for providing 
adequate information security for all agency operations and assets.”131  
FISMA mandates agencies to implement and maintain information security 
policies and procedures consistent with NIST’s technological 
requirements.132  This section addresses the criticism that FISMA, in 
conjunction with NIST, attempts to ensure federal information security 
through reactionary standards designed to minimize the threat posed by 
insecure software, instead of proactively promulgating a regime that 
encourages software manufacturers to design safer software at the outset.133  
Consequently, the effectiveness of FISMA is severely undermined because 
FISMA fails to recognize that economic incentives that encourage 
manufacturers to minimize software insecurity in the design process can 
better promote federal information security than any technological 
requirements FISMA may advance.134 
One critic highlights that NIST recognizes the importance of ensuring 
secure software from the development stage.135  In a report containing a set 
of standards developed and promulgated by NIST for the U.S. Election 
Assistance Commission, NIST states, “experience in testing software and 
systems has shown that testing to high degrees of security and reliability is 
from a practical perspective not possible.  Thus, one needs to build security, 
[and] reliability, . . . into the system design itself and perform a security 
fault analysis on the implementation of the design.”136  Despite recognizing 
that best practice dictates developing secure software and adequately testing 
the software prior to release,137 “NIST has remained silent on how to do 
this as well as what a standard for software might look like.”138 
By failing to properly incentivize software manufacturers to internalize 
externalities, it is believed that FISMA is severely impaired from bolstering 
 
 129. The U.S. government is the single largest purchaser of information security products. 
See CSIS, supra note 72, at 56. 
 130. See supra note 114 and accompanying text. 
 131. 15 U.S.C. § 278g-3(a)(3) (2006). 
 132. 44 U.S.C. § 3544(a)(1)(B)(i) (2006). 
 133. See RICE, supra note 1, at xvii. 
 134. See id.; see also infra note 142 and accompanying text. 
 135. See RICE, supra note 1, at 285. 
 136. NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., REQUIRING SOFTWARE INDEPENDENCE IN VVSG 
2007:  STS RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE TGDC 10 (2006), available at 
http://vote.nist.gov/DraftWhitePaperOnSIinVVSG2007-20061120.pdf.  
 137. See id. 
 138. RICE, supra note 1, at 286. 
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information security throughout federal agencies.139  This is because every 
new piece of information security software introduced into federal agencies 
increases the overall entropy of the security framework established by 
FISMA.140  One critic explains that as entropy increases, more logistical 
support is needed to ensure the adequate implementation of NIST standards 
and overall compliance with FISMA.141  This creates a cycle of inefficiency 
where benefits hardly exceed costs.142 
C. The New FISMA & Recent Developments in Information Security 
In light of the numerous criticisms,143 and a continual increase in security 
attacks within federal agencies,144 commentators have proposed suggested 
changes to FISMA.145  These proposals include holding software 
manufacturers strictly liable for security flaws under products liability 
theory146 and the creation of a new cause of action for the negligent 
enablement of cybercrimes.147  Additionally, incentive systems rooted in 
contract law have also been proposed.148  Congress has also held numerous 
hearings to invite proposals to improve FISMA.149  Most of the hearings 
yielded schemes designed to address agency compliance impediments and 
the underlying metrics FISMA uses to measure information security.150  
 
 139. See infra note 142 and accompanying text. 
 140. See RICE, supra note 1, at 287 (“In no case has a commercial security technology 
been introduced into the market that did not substantially increase the entropy of the system 
as a whole.”). 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. (“The painful irony of this situation is that . . . every security technology we 
introduce into the market simply slows down the applications and systems we are trying to 
protect. . . . Performance starts to lag.  Firewalls slow down network traffic, anti-virus sucks 
down processor cycles on our laptops, intrusion detection systems consume network 
bandwidth with their logging information.  In almost every case, the benefits of security 
technologies are fairly well matched against their costs.  Added in sum, the costs start 
looking rather ridiculous.  When we consider we are paying this money simply to further 
crash test yet more software applications, the costs seem utterly foolish.”). 
 143. See supra Part I.B.1–3. 
 144. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
 145. See infra notes 146–50 and accompanying text. 
 146. See RICE, supra note 1, at 221–32; see generally Pinkney, supra note 27 (advocating 
that software manufacturers be subject to strict products liability). 
 147. See Rustad & Koenig, supra note 28, at 1553; see also RICE, supra note 1, at 232–36. 
 148. See infra Part II.C. 
 149. See, e.g., Agencies in Peril, supra note 67; Personal Information Hearing, supra 
note 75; Weaknesses Hearing, supra note 61. 
 150. See, e.g., Weaknesses Hearing, supra note 61, at 21–22 (statement of Gregory C. 
Wilshusen, Director, Information Security Issues at the Government Accounting Office) (“In 
prior reports, GAO [the Government Accountability Office] and IGs have made hundreds of 
recommendations to agencies for actions necessary to resolve prior significant control 
deficiencies and information security program shortfalls.  For example, we recommended 
agencies correct specific information security deficiencies related to user identification and 
authentication, authorization, boundary protections, cryptography, audit and monitoring and 
physical security.  We have also recommended that agencies fully implement 
comprehensive, agencywide information security programs by correcting weaknesses in risk 
assessments, information security policies and procedures, security planning, security 
training, system tests and evaluations, and remedial actions.  The effective implementation 
of these recommendations will strengthen the security posture at these agencies.”).  Director 
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However, none of the hearings on FISMA or NIST addressed the issue of 
incentivizing software manufactures to ensure adequate information 
security software quality assurance. 
After six years and numerous hearings, the Federal Information Security 
Management Act of 2008 was proposed to Congress.151  The revised 
FISMA proposed to incorporate numerous changes, including heightened 
reporting and independent audits, among others.152  The bill passed the 
Senate’s Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, but the 
110th Session of Congress ended before the bill could be put to a vote.153  
The bill has currently not been reintroduced into the new session of 
Congress.  Thus, the question still remains how to best incentivize software 
manufacturers to ensure adequate software quality assurance. 
II. COMPETING PROPOSALS OVER HOW BEST TO INCENTIVIZE SOFTWARE 
MANUFACTURERS 
Having discussed FISMA, contemporary criticisms of FISMA, and the 
current state of the software industry in Part I, the controversy this Note 
seeks to address in Part II concerns how best to incentivize software 
manufacturers to ensure adequate software quality assurance within federal 
agencies.  Part II.A analyzes proposals rooted in strict liability.  Part II.B 
examines proposals rooted in general negligence theory, including a newly 
envisioned cause of action for the negligent enablement of cybercrime.  
Finally, Part II.C investigates proposals to incentivize software 
manufacturers that are rooted in contract law. 
A. Strict Products Liability 
Many commentators believe that strict products liability presents the best 
vehicle to incentivize the software industry to ensure adequate software 
quality assurance.  This section first explores the arguments offered to 
support the application of strict liability to the software industry, before 
examining the disadvantages of a strict liability standard. 
1. The Case for Strict Liability 
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.154 was one of the first cases to 
allow a plaintiff to recover damages for an injury sustained from using a 
power tool on a theory of liability that “relied neither on proof of fault nor 
 
Wilshusen then proceeded to specifically propose clearer requirements for testing and 
evaluating security controls, enhancing FISMA reporting requirements, and conducting 
annual independent evaluations in accordance with audit standards or a common approach 
and framework. Id. at 26–31. 
 151. S. 3474, 110th Cong. (2008). 
 152. Summary of S. 3474:  Federal Information Security Management Act of 2008, 
GOVTRACK.COM, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s110-3474&tab=summary 
(last visited Sept. 23, 2010). 
 153. Id. 
 154. 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963). 
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on warranty.”155  Approximately two years later, the American Law 
Institute promulgated Section 402A of the Restatement of Torts, which 
recommended courts impose strict liability on manufacturers for defective 
products by finding liability even when “the seller has exercised all possible 
care in the preparation and sale of his product.”156  Numerous rationales for 
strict liability have developed in courts over time.157  These rationales 
generally hold that (1) proving negligence is too burdensome for plaintiffs 
because manufacturers control the production process,158 (2) manufacturers 
are in the best position to absorb and spread the cost of any injury their 
product causes,159 (3) strict liability incentivizes manufacturers to produce 
safer products,160 and (4) contractual remedies cannot be trusted to 
adequately protect the consumer.161 
Commentators believe that many of the barriers strict products liability 
was designed to overcome are pervasive in the software industry, and this 
lends support to extending strict products liability to software 
manufacturers.162  Several observations support this idea.  First, proving 
negligence is too burdensome for plaintiffs because software is becoming 
increasingly complex and consumers can no longer be expected to 
adequately test software products for defects.163  As one commentator 
explains: 
When purchasing a computer it is common for the original hardware to 
come from one supplier, the firmware from a second supplier, and the 
installed operating system from the third supplier using configuration 
 
 155. GOLDBERG ET AL., TORT LAW:  RESPONSIBILITIES AND REDRESS 843 (2008). 
 156. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). 
 157. See, e.g, Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 467 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, 
J., concurring); FRANK J. VANDALL, STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY 17–28 (1989); Gregory C. 
Keating, The Theory of Enterprise Liability and Common Law Strict Liability, 54 VAND. L. 
REV. 1285, 1298 (2001); William L. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability 
to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1116–24 (1960); Roger J. Traynor, The Ways and 
Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. REV. 363, 365–66 (1965); 
Pamela T. Westfall, Note, Hepatitis, AIDS and the Blood Product Exemption from Strict 
Products Liability in California:  A Reassessment, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 1101, 1106–08 (1986). 
 158. See Escola, 150 P.2d at 443 (“Manufacturing processes, frequently valuable secrets, 
are ordinarily either inaccessible to or beyond the ken of the general public.  The consumer 
no longer has means or skill enough to investigate for himself the soundness of a product.”); 
VANDALL, supra note 157, at 21–22. 
 159. Greenman, 377 P.2d at 901.  For additional analysis of this rationale, see Prosser, 
supra note 157, at 1120.  Interestingly, this particular rationale was at one point 
controversial, with one commentator going so far as to call it a step towards socialism. Id. 
 160. See Escola, 150 P.2d at 462; see also VANDALL, supra note 157, at 21; Prosser, 
supra note 157, at 1119 (“It is said . . . that strict liability will provide a healthy and highly 
desirable incentive for producers to make their products safe.”); Traynor, supra note 157, at 
366. 
 161. The doctrine of strict products liability was largely a reaction to the “remarkable 
legal gymnastics” courts were engaging in to impose liability through contract law for 
injuries sustained by a defective product. Prosser, supra note 157, at 1118; see VANDALL, 
supra note 157, at 17–19. 
 162. See infra notes 163–83 and accompanying text. 
 163. See RICE, supra note 1, at 219; Frances E. Zollers et al., No More Soft Landings for 
Software:  Liability for Defects in an Industry That Has Come of Age, 21 SANTA CLARA 
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 745, 755 (2005). 
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(system settings) from yet a fourth supplier.  Add extra hardware, e.g., a 
Network card, from a second hardware supplier that alters firmware 
settings and uses drivers from yet another party.  The drivers alter the way 
the operating system works and interacts with all other hardware; the new 
hardware itself interacts directly with the extant hardware.  The hardware, 
firmware, and software were all designed, built, and tested by humans 
who are fallible.  The original specification was created by a human as 
were the manuals for the end users.  Failure at any stage can result in the 
aspirations of the user not being met.  When dashed expectations also lead 
to injury and death, it is almost impossible for the injured party to 
pinpoint exactly what went wrong and who is responsible.  Strict liability 
is seemingly appropriate for these very reasons.164 
While the commentator believes strict liability is appropriate only when 
software defects lead to physical injury or death, other commentators think 
strict liability is warranted regardless of physical injury or death.165  The 
argument holds that if consumers cannot be expected to adequately inspect 
common household tools like a lawnmower or chainsaw prior to purchase, 
consumers should not be expected to adequately inspect software.166 
Second, consistent with the Greenman court’s rationale for finding a 
products manufacturer strictly liable,167 it has been argued that good public 
policy demands holding software manufacturers strictly liable for damage 
caused by faulty software.168  The lack of tools available to law 
enforcement to combat transnational cybercrime,169 China and Russia’s 
increasing efforts to exploit software vulnerabilities for commercial and 
 
 164. Zollers, supra note 163, at 755. 
 165. See RICE, supra note 1, at 219; Pinkney, supra note 27, at 82. 
 166. See RICE, supra note 1, at 219. 
 167. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc, 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1963).  In Greenman, 
Justice Traynor alluded to his own concurrence in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 
P.2d 436, 467 (Cal. 1944), where he stated: 
Even if there is no negligence, however, public policy demands that responsibility 
be fixed wherever it will most effectively reduce the hazards to life and health 
inherent in defective products that reach the market.  It is evident that the 
manufacturer can anticipate some hazards and guard against the recurrence of 
others, as the public cannot . . . . It is to the public interest to discourage the 
marketing of products having defects that are a menace to the public. . . . Against 
such a risk there should be general and constant protection and the manufacturer is 
best situated to afford such protection. 
150 P.2d 436, 440–41 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring). 
 168. See RICE, supra note 1, at 219–20; Zollers, supra note 163, at 782. 
 169. See Tom Espiner, Interpol:  Give Us Tools To Fight Cybercrime, CNET NEWS (Mar. 
21, 2006), http://news.cnet.com/Interpol-Give-us-tools-to-fight-cybercrime/2100-7348_3-
6052249.html; see generally ROLLINS & HENNING, supra note 107 (analyzing the existing 
U.S. statutory framework and constitutional authority for combating cyberattacks); Mike 
Keyser, Note, The Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, 12 FLA. ST. J. TRANSNAT’L 
L. & POL’Y 287 (2003) (providing a detailed overview of the European Convention on 
Cybercrime); Jennifer J. Rho, Comment, Blackbeards of the Twenty-First Century:  Holding 
Cybercriminals Liable Under the Alien Tort Statute, 7 CHI. J. INT’L L. 695 (2007) 
(highlighting current deficiencies in curbing international cybercrime and proposing 
cybercriminals be held liable under the Alien Tort Statute). 
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political gain,170 and record highs of general cybercrime rates171 are all 
cited as reasons why strict liability should be imposed on software 
manufacturers.172  This argument is premised on the belief that software 
manufacturers are best positioned to prevent larger disorder caused by 
inadequate software quality assurance.173 
Third, critics believe that contract law fails to offer consumers 
meaningful remedies for damage caused by inadequate software quality 
assurance.174  As noted in Part I, software manufacturers rely on adhesion 
contracts and complex licensing agreements to shield themselves from 
contractual liability.175  It is contended that this is not altogether different 
from the legal landscape that initially spurred the adoption of strict products 
liability in the early 1960s.176  As one commentator explains, without a 
strict liability regime that reallocates the risk from the consumer to the 
manufacturer, software manufacturers will never provide warranties to 
remedy consumer losses.177 
Finally, critics maintain that software manufacturers are the “least-cost 
avoider[s]”178 and subjecting software manufacturers to strict products 
liability would incentivize the production of better, safer software.179  The 
argument holds that strict liability would incentivize software 
manufacturers by eradicating “the notion that software may be 
‘incrementally improved’ at the expense of consumers and national 
 
 170. The People’s Republic of China is currently developing an “informationalized” army 
comprised of computer experts manning terminals, in contrast to soldiers manning tanks. See 
Jurich, supra note 1, at 278.  Many U.S. officials and experts “of all political persuasions” 
throughout government and private industry feel China is behind many of the most 
“egregious” cyberattacks on the United States; one senior Air Force official has estimated 
that, “as of two years ago, China has stolen at least 10 to 20 terabytes of data from U.S. 
government networks—the larger figure equal, by some estimates, to one-fifth of the Library 
of Congress’s digital holdings.” Ellen Nakashima & John Pomfret, China Proves To Be an 
Aggressive Foe in Cyberspace, WASH. POST (Nov. 11, 2009), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/10/AR2009111017588.html. 
 171. Press Release, Internet Crime Complaint Center, IC3 2008 Annual Report on 
Internet Crime Released (Mar. 31, 2009), available at 
http://www.ic3.gov/media/2009/090331.aspx (“[O]nline crime hit a record high in 2008.  
IC3 received a total of 275,284 complaints, a 33.1% increase over the previous year.”); see 
ROLLINS & HENNING, supra note 107, at 2 (“Threats to the U.S. cyber and 
telecommunications infrastructure are constantly increasing . . . .”). 
 172. See RICE, supra note 1, at 219. 
 173. See id.; see supra note 159 and accompanying text. 
 174. See RICE, supra note 1, at 182; see supra notes 121–23 and accompanying text. 
 175. See supra notes 121–23 and accompanying text. 
 176. See supra note 161 and accompanying text. 
 177. Emily Kuwahara, Note, Torts v. Contracts:  Can Microsoft Be Held Liable to Home 
Consumers for Its Security Flaws?, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 997, 1015 (2007). 
 178. See RICE, supra note 1, at 218 (“[S]oftware manufacturers are better able to bear the 
financial burden of addressing software weaknesses than buyers of software.  In short, it 
makes more sense to assign the task of securing software to a relatively small number of 
software manufacturers compared to burdening the software’s 500 million potential users 
with the responsibility.  It is also far cheaper in financial and social costs to make software 
manufacturers the least-cost avoider.”). But see Rustad & Koenig, supra note 28, at 1605–06 
(advocating negligence liability because there may be occasions where the plaintiff is the 
least-cost avoider). 
 179. See Zollers, supra note 163, at 769; see also RICE, supra note 1, at 232. 
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infrastructure.”180  Specifically, imposing strict liability would remove the 
first-to-market mentality with which the software industry operates,181 and 
would shift the responsibility for adequately testing software from the 
consumer to the manufacturer.182  Faced with strict liability, software 
manufacturers would be forced to take extra measures to protect themselves 
from future liability.183 
2. Strict Liability:  Limitations & Disadvantages 
The previous section analyzed the argument that imposing strict products 
liability on the software industry is consistent with the larger rationales of 
strict liability.  It also evaluated the argument that strict liability would 
incentivize software manufacturers to ensure adequate software quality 
assurance.  This section assesses the doctrinal limitations that work to 
shield software manufacturers from strict products liability and then 
discusses perceived policy disadvantages that commentators believe would 
flow from subjecting software manufacturers to strict products liability. 
a. Doctrinal Limitations 
Despite the advantages of strict products liability184 and the potential for 
the doctrine to incentivize better software quality assurance,185 many 
believe that this is impossible to achieve in light of various doctrinal 
hurdles.186  First, there is a debate over whether or not software constitutes 
a “product” for purposes of applying strict products liability.187  Some point 
to the Restatement of Torts,188 which defines “product” as “tangible 
personal property,”189 and deliberately excludes “information” from the 
definition190 as a reason why strict liability is not the appropriate vehicle to 
incentivize software manufacturers.191  This interpretation is aided by the 
observance that, while courts generally extend the definition of “goods” to 
include “software” for purposes of applying the Uniform Commercial Code 
 
 180. See RICE, supra note 1, at 232. 
 181. See id.  For an explanation of the specific motivating forces behind the “first-to-
market” mentality, see supra notes 117–20 and accompanying text. 
 182. See RICE, supra note 1, at 232; see Zollers, supra note 163, at 771. 
 183. See RICE, supra note 1, at 232; see also supra note 160 and accompanying text. 
 184. See supra notes 158–83 and accompanying text. 
 185. See supra notes 179–83 and accompanying text. 
 186. See infra notes 187–201 and accompanying text. 
 187. Compare Rustad & Koenig, supra note 28, at 1581 (“Software is neither a good nor 
a product, but rather an intangible collection of digital information:  code composed of 1s 
and 0s.”), with Kuwahara, supra note 177, at 1018–20 (explaining how courts generally 
classify software as a “product” for purposes of applying the Uniform Commercial Code), 
and Zollers, supra note 163 at 760 (finding software sufficiently analogous to aeronautical 
charts and books to warrant classification as a “product”). 
 188. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 19(a) (1998). 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. § 19(a) cmt. d. 
 191. See generally David W. Lannetti, Toward a Revised Definition of “Product” Under 
the Restatement (Third) of Torts:  Products Liability, 55 BUS. LAW. 799 (2000) (arguing that 
the current definition of “product” in the Restatement precludes software). 
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(U.C.C.),192 courts have been reluctant to stretch this interpretation to 
permit a strict products liability theory of recovery against software 
manufacturers.193 
Other problems also plague the application of the strict products liability 
doctrine to software manufacturers.  Even if software were considered a 
“product” for purposes of allowing strict liability to attach, plaintiffs would 
still struggle to prove design defect.  The issue of what criteria should be 
used when evaluating what constitutes a design defect is one of the most 
contested debates in products liability law.194  Generally, the concepts of 
risk balancing, utility, and the availability of an alternative design are 
employed in some fashion.195  At least one commentator feels that plaintiffs 
would likely lose if these concepts are employed when evaluating a 
software operating system design, such as Microsoft Windows.196 
Finally, even if a plaintiff could prove that software was a product that 
was defectively designed, the economic loss rule effectively forecloses the 
possibility of drastically incentivizing software manufacturers.  While 
actors are generally prohibited from engaging in behavior that may cause 
reasonably foreseeable damage to tangible property, “they have no such 
general obligation to avoid depriving persons of economic prospects.”197  
Accordingly, deleted files,198 damage caused by the misappropriation of 
data,199 and damage caused by denial-of-service attacks would not 
constitute proper “damage” for purposes of recovery.200  This economic 
loss rule reinforces the prevailing belief that software manufacturers should 
be shielded from liability for countervailing public policy reasons.201 
 
 192. See Kuwahara, supra note 177, at 1018–20 (explaining how courts generally apply 
the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) Article 2 on the sale of goods to software and the 
rationale for courts doing so). But see Rustad & Koenig, supra note 28, at 1581 (“Software is 
licensed with restrictions on the conditions of use and is therefore unlike tangible products 
that can be used at the discretion of the purchaser.  Network security software is frequently a 
hybrid of sales and services.”).  Although courts generally find software to be a “product,” 
the decision to apply Article 2 of the UCC generally turns on whether the complex licensing 
agreements used by software manufacturers constitute a “sale.” Kuwahara, supra note 177, 
at 1018. 
 193. See Farhah Abdullah, Strict Versus Negligence Software Product Liability, 2 
COMPUTER & INFO. SCI. 81, 86 (2009). 
 194. See GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 155, at 875. 
 195. Id. 
 196. See Kuwahara, supra note 177, at 1024 (“[T]he utility and productivity resulting 
from . . . product integration far outweigh[s] any risks.  Given the complexity of building an 
operating system, showing a reasonable alternative to the court—in other words, designing a 
new operating system—would be a near impossible task.”). 
 197. GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 155, at 97; see Kuwahara, supra note 177, at 1025–26 
(“The most common injuries in a cybersecurity case will be the loss of data, financial harm, 
dignitary injury, and an invasion of privacy—all damages that cannot be characterized as 
physical injuries or damage to ‘other property.’”); see also NMP Corp. v. Parametric Tech. 
Corp., 958 F. Supp. 1536, 1546–47 (N.D. Okla. 1997) (rejecting software manufacturer 
liability based on the economic loss rule).  See Rustad & Koenig, supra note 28, at 1580 for 
a detailed analysis of the Parametric case. 
 198. See Kuwahara, supra note 177, at 1026–29. 
 199. Id. at 1029–30. 
 200. Id. at 1030–31. 
 201. Id.; see infra notes 202–09 and accompanying text. 
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b. Policy Disadvantages 
Many commentators believe that subjecting software manufacturers to 
strict products liability would be inconsistent with sound public policy even 
if Congress or the courts were to carve an exception to the limitations 
described above.  First, it has been alleged that subjecting software 
manufacturers to strict products liability cannot solve the problem of 
defective software.202  This is because any piece of software, and the 
interactions the software has with other software, is so complex that it is 
impossible to design and test a program that could operate as planned in an 
infinite number of environments.203  This is, to some degree, supported by 
an empirical study that concluded that “[o]ne defect is injected for every 7 
to 10 lines of new and changed [software] code produced.”204  However, 
critics dispute the ultimate meaning of software complexity.  The same 
empirical study found that the top twenty Internet vulnerabilities are all 
caused by “poor coding, testing and sloppy software engineering . . . [and 
that] [t]echnical solutions exist to them all, but they are simply not 
implemented.”205 
In addition to potentially incentivizing solutions to a problem that cannot 
be fixed, critics also believe that strict liability would stifle innovation, 
over-deter risk taking, and stunt the growth of the software industry.206  If 
one party bears all foreseeable and unforeseeable risk,207 that party may 
avoid the benefits associated with innovation because they cannot 
accurately gauge the scope of the risk associated with innovation.208  Even 
if software manufacturers did decide to continue producing innovative 
products in the face of uncertain legal liability, one disastrous injury could 
subject a manufacturer to “ruinous liability.”209  Critics counter that the 
software manufacturing industry is a multi-billion dollar industry 
dominated by a limited number of companies among product categories and 
is therefore mature enough to handle strict products liability exposure.210 
 
 202. See Zollers, supra note 163, at 769 
 203. See id. (“There are those who claim that there is no such thing as ‘bug-free 
software.’”). 
 204. Noopur Davis, Developing Secure Software, 8 SOFTWARE TECH NEWS (July 2005), 
http://www.softwaretechnews.com/stn_view.php?stn_id=2&article_id=34. 
 205. Davis, supra note 204.  At least one critic believes the complexity of software 
coding actually supports the application of strict products liability because it relieves 
potential plaintiffs from having to prove negligence, which could be substantially more 
difficult. Zollers, supra note 163, at 769–70.  Zollers also argues that the relative market 
monopoly software manufacturers gain through patents on specific technologies makes strict 
liability a small price to pay. Id. at 770–71. 
 206. See RICE, supra note 1, at 215–16. But see Zollers, supra note 163, at 771–73. 
 207. See RICE, supra note 1, at 215–16.  This is one of the fundamental distinctions 
between strict liability and ordinary negligence. 
 208. See Rustad & Koenig, supra note 28, at 1579 (“In most cases, an empirically-based 
risk/benefit calculation is impossible because information concerning the foreseeable 
likelihood of a computer intrusion and the burden of risk-prevention measures is limited.”). 
 209. Kuwahara, supra note 177, at 1030–31. 
 210. See Zollers, supra note 163, at 779–80.  As Zollers explains, “The industry is 
consolidating and strengthening, and large market players have emerged as dominant forces 
in the economy. . . .  These companies . . . have the . . . resources to devote to . . . extra 
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B. Negligence 
The previous section analyzed the potential use of strict products liability 
to incentivize software manufactures to ensure heightened software quality 
assurance, as well as the perceived disadvantages to imposing such liability.  
This section examines the viability of applying negligence liability to 
incentivize software manufacturers.  Specifically, this section explores the 
“Negligent Enablement of Cybercrime,” a theoretical tort proposed by 
Professors Michael L. Rustad and Thomas H. Koenig in 2005.211  Finally, 
this section examines the disadvantages to negligence-based liability rules. 
1. The Negligent Enablement of Cybercrime 
Due to the high risk of computer intrusions,212 Rustad and Koenig 
proposed that courts embrace a modified duty of care213 that would require 
software manufacturers to incorporate reasonable security measures into 
software.214  Based on premise liability,215 warranty,216 and negligence-
based products liability,217 the negligent enablement of cybercrime tort 
would “provide injured consumers and users with remedies when defective 
software paves the way for cybercrime.”218 
According to Rustad and Koenig, a new cause of action for the negligent 
enablement of cybercrime would have several distinct advantages.  First, 
the tort recognizes that software manufacturers are most capable and best 
 
testing . . . [and] to pay for injuries that may result from defects.” Id. at 782.  Some 
commentators have cited the reform and success of the automobile industry in the face of 
strict products liability to support the imposition of strict products liability on software 
manufacturers. See RICE, supra note 1, at 219–20; Rustad & Koenig, supra note 28, at 1608. 
See generally CORNELIUS W. GILLAM, PRODUCTS LIABILITY IN THE AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY 
185–95 (1960) (explaining the successful reform brought about by subjecting the automobile 
industry to strict products liability). 
 211. See Rustad & Koenig, supra note 28, at 1553. 
 212. See id. at 1557; supra note 105 and accompanying text (highlighting the existence of 
40,000 known software vulnerabilities). 
 213. Rustad and Koenig proposed that this modified duty be determined by the balancing 
of factors such as 
the foreseeability of the harm of computer viruses or other breaches of security; 
the degree of certainty between software vulnerabilities and harm; the connection 
between lax internet security practices and the injury suffered by a computer user; 
the policy of preventing future intrusions; the burden on the information industry 
and the consequences to the community of imposing a duty to maintain adequate 
security; and the availability, costs, and prevalence of security solutions and 
insurance. 
Rustad & Koenig, supra note 28, at 1586. But see Kuwahara, supra note 177, at 1004 
(“[Requiring foreseeability] makes it more difficult for plaintiffs who are not security experts 
to bring suit, while doing nothing to limit damages for a widespread . . . attack.”). 
 214. See Rustad & Koenig, supra note 28, at 1557. 
 215. See id. at 1558.  In their analysis, Rustad and Koenig argue that negligent software 
manufacturers expose their customers to “predators” not unlike a retail store that “fails to 
employ security guards in a high crime area.” Id. at 1582. 
 216. Id. at 1558. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. 
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positioned to mitigate foreseeable cybercrime219 and, as a result, reallocates 
the cost of foreseeable cybercrimes from the consumer to the 
manufacturer.220  Rustad and Koenig believe that this would properly 
incentivize software manufacturers to “allocat[e] more resources to 
preventing cybercrime through better design, fortified product warnings, 
and more thorough testing.”221  The result of this reallocation of resources 
would be safer, more secure software, and less cybercrime.222 
Second, Rustad and Koenig argue that a negligent enablement of 
cybercrime cause of action is preferable to a strict products liability rule.223  
This argument is rooted in the belief that courts would be more receptive to 
imposing a negligence-based liability rule on software manufacturers.224  
Contemporary products liability law is experiencing a “pronounced” shift 
away from strict liability and courts are once again favoring negligence.225  
Additionally, Rustad and Koenig believe that while courts have been 
unwilling to extend strict products liability to pure economic losses, courts 
may be more willing to “recognize a negligent enablement theory of 
product liability where prior similar computer intrusions signal a software 
manufacturer’s ill-considered design decisions.”226 
Third, it is believed that a negligent enablement of cybercrime tort would 
reward socially responsible software manufactures,227 which would have 
the effect of reshaping the software manufacturing industry.228  Finally, a 
negligence-based liability rule recognizes that plaintiffs are occasionally in 
a better position to avoid or minimize the risk of cybercrime.229  As a result, 
a negligence-based liability rule affords greater protection and flexibility to 
defendants by allowing contributory negligence, comparative negligence, 
and assumption of risk defenses.230 
 
 219. Id. at 1598; see Michael D. Scott, Tort Liability for Vendors of Insecure Software:  
Has the Time Finally Come?, 67 MD. L. REV. 425, 444 (2008) (“Because vendors (meaning 
developers and suppliers of the software) generally distribute only the machine-readable 
object code of their products, they are the only ones who know the actual level of security of 
their software and, therefore, are the only ones who can isolate and repair the problems.”). 
 220. See Rustad & Koenig, supra note 28, at 1598. 
 221. Id. at 1608–09. 
 222. See id. at 1610. 
 223. See infra notes 225–26 and accompanying text. 
 224. See infra notes 225–26 and accompanying text. 
 225. See Rustad & Koenig, supra note 28, at 1609.  As Professor William M. Landes and 
Judge Richard A. Posner explain, the costs associated with administering a liability rule may 
be divided into “information costs” and “claim costs.”  Information costs are empirically 
higher under a negligence rule, and claim costs are higher under a strict liability rule.  
However, because of the decline in information costs due to increased “literacy and 
knowledge of how the physical world operates” courts have moved away from strict liability 
and towards negligence as the “dominant rule of liability.” WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD 
A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 65–66 (1987). 
 226. Rustad & Koenig, supra note 28, at 1580. But see Kuwahara, supra note 177, at 
1003 (“Why courts may favor this negligence theory over strict products liability theory for 
the same purely economic damage remains unclear.”). 
 227. See Rustad & Koenig, supra note 28, at 1610. 
 228. See id. 
 229. Id. at 1606. 
 230. Id. at 1604–07. 
2010] A POTEMKIN VILLAGE 397 
2. Disadvantages to a Negligence-Based Liability Rule 
The previous section introduced and highlighted the purported 
advantages to the “Negligent Enablement of Cybercrime,” a theoretical tort 
proposed by Rustad and Koenig in 2005.  Putting aside that Congress has 
explicitly foreclosed any negligence-based liability for software 
manufacturers,231 this section addresses common difficulties associated 
with a negligence-based liability rule, and the perceived policy 
disadvantages that commentators believe would flow from subjecting 
software manufacturers to negligence-based liability. 
Rustad and Koenig admit courts may “grapple” with causation problems 
when adjudicating disputes where the negligent enablement of cybercrime 
is alleged.232  Specifically, “redundant multiple causes would preclude 
liability under the ‘but for’ analysis.”233  Even the “substantial factor” test 
adopted by the Restatement of Torts234 may prove difficult for courts to 
implement when multiple security flaws exist, or when security flaws on 
multiple networks are exploited in a cybercrime.235  Furthermore, in the 
absence of empirical studies analyzing the frequency and cost of software 
exploitation, “it may prove difficult to evaluate the radius of the risk created 
by insecure software.”236  Thus, courts may also struggle to determine a 
meaningful standard by which to analyze proximate cause.237  Increased 
uncertainty over the application of the negligent enablement tort could 
potentially disincentivize software manufacturers from implementing 
adequate software quality assurance standards.238 
From a more general perspective, critics maintain that a negligence-based 
liability rule may disincentivize plaintiffs, which would fail to properly 
incentivize software manufacturers and could potentially lead to under-
deterrence.239  This is explained by the high administrative costs associated 
with proving negligence.240  Plaintiffs must prove duty, breach, causation, 
 
 231. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g) (2006); see supra note 126 and accompanying text. 
 232. See Rustad & Koenig, supra note 28, at 1601. 
 233. Id. (quoting JOHN DIAMOND, UNDERSTANDING TORTS 202 (1999)). 
 234. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 435 (1965). 
 235. See Rustad & Koenig, supra note 28, at 1601. 
 236. See id. at 1602. 
 237. See id. 
 238. See THOMAS J. MICELI, ECONOMICS OF THE LAW 45 (1997) (“[U]ncertainty about the 
due standard may result in . . . too little care compared to the social optimum.”).  Professor 
Miceli identifies two areas of uncertainty that may disincentivize software manufacturers:  
(1) uncertainty by injurers about the due standard, and (2) errors by the court in determining 
compliance with the negligence standard. Id. at 45–46.  According to Miceli, both have the 
possibility of leading to either over-deterrence or under-deterrence. Id.; see LANDES & 
POSNER, supra note 225, at 234–51 (using an economic approach to torts to prove situations 
where uncertainty over causation could lead to over or under-deterrence). 
 239. See RICE, supra note 1, at 216–17 (“[T]he expense of pursuing a negligence suit can 
act as a disincentive to plaintiffs that should otherwise be willing to file suit for actual harm.  
This can result in under-deterrence . . . .”); see also MICELI, supra note 238, at 43 (explaining 
how litigation costs interact with a manufacturer’s incentive to comply with the standard of 
due care). 
 240. See RICE, supra note 1, at 216. 
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and damages.241  Demonstrating that a software manufacturer was negligent 
could become exceedingly expensive because an individual piece of 
software’s development lifecycle may not include legal process constraints, 
and the development process may need to be evaluated from “meager 
process documentation.”242  Consequently, high administrative costs 
function to discourage potential plaintiffs and may result in under-
deterrence because software manufacturers are not “bearing the full cost of 
their risky activities.”243  Finally, imposing a standard of care on software 
manufacturers too early in the development stage may stifle innovation and 
deter software manufacturers from pursuing innovative approaches to 
improve security.244 
C. Contract Remedies 
Parts II.A and II.B analyzed incentive systems rooted in tort liability.  
This section evaluates the potential for contract law to incentivize software 
manufacturers to ensure adequate software quality assurance.  This section 
examines the current state of contract law with respect to software licensing 
agreements.  Finally, this section analyzes potential solutions designed to 
incentivize software manufacturers through contract law. 
1. The Software Licensing Agreement:  Disincentivizing Software 
Manufacturers 
Contract law applies to a substantial majority of software cases because 
they involve pure economic loss.245  While courts initially struggled to 
classify software as a “good” for the purposes of applying the U.C.C.,246 
modern courts have generally determined that software is a “good,” and 
therefore that the U.C.C. does apply.247  Consequently, the U.C.C. allows 
 
 241. See GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 155, at 48.  For a further explanation of the 
specific criteria that may be used to construct the duty element, see supra note 213. 
 242. See Clark Savage Turner & Foaad Khosmood, Rethinking Software Process:  The 
Key to Negligence Liability 1–2 (2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://users.csc.calpoly.edu/~csturner/rethinking.pdf.  “Process documentation” describes 
documents that are generated during the software development process to record the process 
by which software is created and maintained.  Thus, when software manufacturers develop 
software in an environment free of regulations designed to ensure compliance with 
applicable legal standards, plaintiffs must rely on process documentation. Id. at 1–3. 
 243. RICE, supra note 1, at 216. But see LANDES & POSNER, supra note 225, at 64 
(arguing that strict liability will not cause manufacturers to take any more due care than a 
negligence liability rule). 
 244. See Kuwahara, supra note 177, at 1004. 
 245. See Zollers, supra note 163, at 764. 
 246. See Kuwahara, supra note 177, at 1018.  The initial difficulty stemmed from 
software that was custom-made for a consumer.  Courts generally found such software to be 
a “service” and thus subject to common law negligence and contracts doctrines. Id. 
 247. See Zollers, supra note 163, at 765; see also Kuwahara, supra note 177, at 1020 
(speculating various rationales for courts finding software to constitute a “good”).  Another 
potential obstacle manifests itself in the license agreement and whether or not the agreement 
constitutes a “sale.”  Courts have traditionally found that software-licensing agreements 
constitute a sale. See Zollers, supra note 163, at 765–66.  It should be noted that this analysis 
excludes the Uniform Computer Information Transaction Act (UCITA) because only two 
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software manufacturers to disclaim nearly all warranties248 and to limit 
damages for unforeseeable liability.249  Consider the following licensing 
agreement: 
THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED “AS IS” AND ANY EXPRESSED 
OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, 
THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND 
FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN 
NO EVENT SHALL THE CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY 
DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR 
CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED 
TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; 
LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS 
INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF 
LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR 
TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN 
ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF 
ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.250 
This hypothetical licensing agreement is representative of the typical 
software license agreement.251  Courts traditionally uphold such 
contracts.252  Thus, “[t]he software user, by agreeing to the language in a 
software license, forgoes any right to pursue legal action against the seller 
and accepts the full weight and burden of risk for using the software.”253  
This functions as a disincentive for software manufacturers to ensure 
adequate software quality assurance.254 
 
states have currently adopted UCITA. See Kuwahara, supra note 177, at 1020.  However, 
were UCITA to be broadly adopted, it is unlikely that software manufacturers would ever 
face liability. Id. at 1020–21. 
 248. U.C.C. § 2-316 (2005).  Indeed, the U.C.C. seems to encourage the disclaimer of 
warranties. See R. Joseph Barton, Note, Drowning in a Sea of Contract:  Application of the 
Economic Loss Rule to Fraud and Negligence Misrepresentation Claims, 41 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 1789, 1826 (2000); see also KNAPP ET AL., PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW 507 (2007). 
 249. U.C.C. § 2-316(4) (2005). 
 250. RICE, supra note 1, at 179. 
 251. Id. Cf. Apple iTunes Software Product Agreement, 
http://images.apple.com/legal/sla/docs/itunes.pdf, at 1 (last visited Sept. 23, 2010) (“APPLE 
. . . HEREBY DISCLAIM[S] ALL WARRANTIES . . . EITHER EXPRESS, IMPLIED OR 
STATUTORY, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES 
AND/OR CONDITIONS OF MERCHANTABILITY . . . OF FITNESS FOR A 
PARTICULAR PURPOSE . . .  APPLE DOES NOT WARRANT . . . THAT THE 
OPERATION OF THE APPLE SOFTWARE OR SERVICE WILL BE UNINTERRUPTED 
OR ERROR-FREE, OR THAT DEFECTS IN THE APPLE SOFTWARE OR SERVICES 
WILL BE CORRECTED.  NO ORAL OR WRITTEN INFORMATION OR ADVICE 
GIVEN BY APPLE . . . SHALL CREATE A WARRANTY.”). 
 252. See Kuwahara, supra note 177, at 1023; see also RICE, supra note 1, at 182 (“The 
current legal trend in the United States is to enforce one-sided software agreements as long 
as the user has an opportunity to read and ‘manifest assent’ to the terms.”).  Software license 
agreements generally contain a minimal remedy to avoid being declared unconscionable.  
See Kuwahara, supra note 177, at 1023. 
 253. RICE, supra note 1, at 180. 
 254. See supra notes 127–29 and accompanying text. 
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2. A Proposed Solution Rooted in Contract Law 
Many commentators have dismissed the idea that contract law could be 
used as a vehicle to properly incentivize software manufacturers255 given 
the obstacles erected by licensing agreements.256  However, at least one 
commentator believes contract law has the potential to properly incentivize 
software manufacturers should specific reform be enacted.  These reforms 
center on the imposition of a “mandatory warranty” that would “restrict 
software vendors’ ability to disclaim liability, while capping damages to a 
predetermined amount.”257  The mandatory warranty would allow for the 
recovery of consequential damages258 in the event that a security flaw 
within the software caused the damages.259 
A mandatory warranty is claimed to have the ability to incentivize 
software manufacturers for one primary reason:  unlike strict products 
liability or negligence, a “breach of warranty claim permits recovery for 
economic losses.”260  The mandatory warranty encourages consumers to 
maintain reasonable security while also incentivizing software 
manufacturers to produce software with fewer vulnerabilities because the 
consumer’s conduct may be considered in warranty disputes.261  Hence, the 
mandatory warranty promotes the “same policy goals that drive the desire 
to impose tort liability . . . while appropriately limiting liability.”262  
Finally, a mandatory warranty is alleged to be easier to implement than a 
negligence or strict liability rule because it circumvents the need to 
analogize software to tangible products263 or carve out exceptions to the 
economic loss doctrine.264 
Of course, it is theorized that a mandatory warranty would be burdened 
by several perceived disadvantages.  Demonstrating causation with respect 
to consequential damages could prove difficult.265  This could present a 
“high bar” for potential plaintiffs.266  Additionally, quantifying damages 
may also prove difficult.267  Finally, drawing appropriate lines of liability 
may prove to be a complicated endeavor.268  Due to these limitations, it has 
 
 255. See RICE, supra note 1, at 179–85; Rustad & Koenig, supra note 28, at 1562–67; 
Zollers, supra note 163, at 757–58. 
 256. See supra Part II.C.1. 
 257. Kuwahara, supra note 177, at 1032. 
 258. Id.  Consequential damages are defined by the U.C.C. to include “injury to person or 
property proximately resulting from any breach of warranty.” U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(b) (2005). 
 259. See Kuwahara, supra note 177, at 1032. 
 260. Id. at 1032; see Scott, supra note 219, at 453–54. See generally Barton, supra note 
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 261. See Kuwahara, supra note 177, at 1032–34. 
 262. Id. at 1034. 
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 267. See id. at 1033. 
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been suggested that damages should be capped at a pre-determined amount, 
and revisiting the cap approximately every two years for reevaluation.269 
III. THE TIME IS NOW FOR REFORM:  FISMA REFORMS THAT MANDATE A 
NARROW EXPRESS WARRANTY WOULD PROPERLY INCENTIVIZE 
SOFTWARE MANUFACTURERS AND INCREASE NATIONAL AND      
ECONOMIC SECURITY 
Part I of this Note introduced FISMA, the federal statutory scheme 
designed to increase federal information security and deter cyber attacks.  
Part I also described common criticisms of FISMA, including the charge 
that FISMA is fundamentally flawed because it treats information security 
as a technological problem and not an economic problem.  Specifically, 
FISMA attempts to impose technological safeguards designed to mitigate 
weaknesses caused by software vulnerabilities, while ignoring the root 
cause of software vulnerabilities, which is inadequate software quality 
assurance on the part of software manufacturers.  Part II analyzed proposed 
solutions designed to incentivize software manufacturers to ensure adequate 
software quality assurance.  Part II evaluated proposals rooted in strict 
products liability, negligence liability, and contract remedies.  Part III 
outlines a plan, premised on the framework provided by FISMA, and a 
mandatory express warranty, that incentivizes software manufacturers to 
ensure adequate software quality assurance.  Finally, Part III highlights the 
advantages and disadvantages to such an incentive scheme. 
A. Together With a Mandatory Express Warranty, FISMA Provides a 
Useful Framework Capable of Incentivizing Software Manufacturers 
No statutory or legislative scheme designed to increase federal 
cybersecurity can succeed absent a liability rule that incentivizes software 
manufacturers to ensure adequate software quality assurance.  Thus, 
FISMA and NIST should be used as a vehicle to incentivize software 
manufacturers.  This could be accomplished by mandating that federal 
agencies only procure from the private sector software that contains a 
security certification that assures the product is free of all vulnerabilities 
identified on the SANS Institute Top Twenty list.270  Such a certification 
would create an express warranty that FISMA would deny manufacturers 
from disclaiming or limiting in any way.  A timetable would be created for 
federal agencies to fully implement the described procurement 
requirements, which would be designed to give software manufacturers an 
 
 269. Id. 
 270. See Top 20 Internet Security Problems, Threats and Risks, SANS INSTITUTE 
http://www.sans.org/top20 (last visited Sept. 23, 2010).  In this scenario, the software 
manufacturers would be self-certifying their own software.  Of course, the SANS Institute 
Top Twenty list (now referred to as the “SANS Top Cyber Security Risks”) need not be the 
exact list used, but the list provides an unbiased assessment of the most frequently exploited 
software vulnerabilities from some of the most respected organizations in the industry, and 
the list is updated annually to maintain relevancy. Id.  For an evaluation of software 
manufacturers’ abilities to comply with this list, see Davis, supra note 204. 
402 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79 
adequate amount of time to implement necessary changes to the design 
process. 
FISMA could properly incentivize software manufacturers to ensure 
adequate software quality assurance if it were to require federal agencies to 
only procure software that was free of the top twenty Internet 
vulnerabilities, and mandate that such software be backed by a non-
disclaimable express warranty.  Such a requirement would allow federal 
agencies to seek consequential damages for damages caused by software 
vulnerabilities listed in the SANS Institute’s Top Twenty list.271  Should the 
software manufacturer fail to honor the warranty, as opposed to strict 
products liability272 and negligence-based liability rules,273 federal agencies 
would have the power to file a breach of express warranty claim, which 
circumvents the economic loss rule.274  This would have the effect of 
reallocating the risk of defective software to the software manufacturer and 
providing monetary incentives to develop software free of the most 
dangerous Internet vulnerabilities.  As a result, real cybersecurity within 
federal agencies would exponentially increase without most of the difficult 
implementation problems275 or ineffective, burdensome reporting 
requirements FISMA currently imposes.276 
Importantly, implementing the latter system through FISMA would have 
numerous ancillary benefits while overcoming or avoiding many of the 
disadvantages associated with strict products liability,277 negligence-based 
liability rules,278 and the mandatory warranty scheme articulated in Part 
II.C.279  First, implementation through the FISMA framework affords a 
tremendous level of predictability for software manufacturers.  This is 
because liability would be tied to a predictable standard of care that 
manufacturers could build into the software development process from the 
earliest stages of development.  Every vulnerability on the SANS Institute 
Top Twenty list “is a result of poor coding, testing and sloppy software 
engineering”280 where solutions exist but are simply not implemented.281  
Thus, software manufacturers are not being forced to develop costly new 
solutions to software vulnerabilities, but rather to implement procedural 
safeguards to prevent problems with known solutions. 
Implementing a mandatory express warranty through FISMA would 
provide additional predictability to software manufacturers due to the 
limited scope of liability.  FISMA regulates federal agencies.  As opposed 
to any of the sweeping proposals described in Part II, software 
 
 271. See supra note 258 and accompanying text. 
 272. See supra notes 197–201 and accompanying text. 
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 276. See supra Part I.B.2. 
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manufacturers would only be liable for the most egregious breaches that 
occur within federal agencies, and because of the nature of the underlying 
information being protected, such liability is justified.  This not only limits 
the breadth of potential liability and the number of claims a software 
manufacturer may face, but also is consistent with good public policy.282  
Additionally, the certainty afforded by limiting the breadth of potential 
liability to federal agencies and premising a standard of care on the SANS 
Institute Top Twenty list mitigates any concern over manufacturers 
becoming too risk-averse to continue developing innovative software.283 
Federal agencies would be expected to maintain reasonable security so as 
not to void the express warranty.  However, in contrast to the mandatory 
warranty analyzed in Part II.C, implementing a mandatory express warranty 
through FISMA would have the added advantage of a pre-existing standard 
by which to measure the “reasonableness” of a federal agency’s security 
maintenance.  The pre-existing standard would take the form of applicable 
NIST protocols, which federal agencies are mandated by FISMA to comply 
with.284  Should a federal agency violate an applicable protocol, it would 
void the express warranty and relieve the software manufacturer of liability.  
This would incentivize federal agencies to comply with FISMA. 
Finally, implementing a mandatory warranty through FISMA would 
potentially have a spillover effect into the private consumer market.  
Software products developed to meet FISMA requirements could be made 
available to the private consumer market.  This would provide increased 
security to consumers at no extra cost.  Software security across the private 
sector would increase and software manufacturers would avoid the 
unlimited liability they would face under a strict products liability rule.285 
B. Potential Roadblocks to Success 
Despite a host of advantages, there are at least two problems that could 
derail the effectiveness of the incentive system detailed in the previous 
section.  A primary concern is the federal government’s market power.286  
Transacting with the federal government and providing software to federal 
agencies is a voluntary activity.  Should FISMA require software 
manufacturers to ensure heightened software quality assurance to conduct 
business with the federal government, it is entirely possible, and likely, that 
some manufacturers would simply stop transacting with the federal 
government.  However, several considerations minimize the risk that a 
materially significant number of manufacturers would stop transacting with 
the federal government.  First, all of the software vulnerabilities on the 
SANS Institute Top-Twenty list have known solutions that are all capable 
of being prevented through heightened software quality assurance.287  Thus, 
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the risk of incurring actual liability is severely diminished, yet still real 
enough to warrant guaranteed compliance.  Mature software manufacturers 
would have little difficulty complying with this standard.  Second, if 
software manufacturers still felt the risk of incurring actual liability was too 
high, they would have the ability to purchase insurance to hedge their 
risk.288  Finally, even assuming a sizeable number of software 
manufacturers ceased conducting business with the federal government for 
fear of liability, other willing software manufacturers, would fill the new 
demand created by manufacturers who left the supply market.  Of course, 
whether these new manufacturers would provide the same level of software 
sophistication is questionable. 
In addition to the federal government’s questionable market power, as 
with the incentive solution outlined in Part II.C, quantifying damages could 
prove difficult.289  Quantifying the monetary value of stolen electronic 
documents or databases, proprietary information, classified information, 
disabled networks, or critical infrastructure and the resulting collateral 
damage could potentially bankrupt even the most solvent software 
manufacturer.  For this reason, damages could be capped at a pre-
determined amount. This amount would be commensurate to the designated 
FISMA risk level determined by the relative worth of the information or 
interests being protected by the system utilizing the software containing the 
vulnerability.290  This would further shield software manufacturers from 
excessive liability while still providing an incentive to ensure adequate 
software quality assurance.  The increased predictability would also further 
deter software manufacturers from ceasing to conduct business with the 
federal government. 
 
CONCLUSION 
In its current form, FISMA has outlived its usefulness and is no longer 
efficiently enhancing federal cybersecurity.  FISMA is marred with 
implementation difficulties.291  Furthermore, FISMA reporting 
requirements do not accurately measure the strength of operational security, 
and provide little incentive to do so.292  However, FISMA’s greatest 
transgression is that it treats information security as a technological 
problem that demands technological solutions.  In doing so, FISMA causes 
federal agencies to spend millions of dollars imposing technological 
safeguards designed to mitigate weaknesses caused by software 
vulnerabilities, while ignoring the root cause of software vulnerabilities, 
 
 288. See Kuwahara, supra note 177, at 1010–12 (explaining the rise of cyberinsurance); 
see also Dan Briody, Full Coverage, INC. (Apr. 1, 2007), 
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 289. See supra note 267 and accompanying text. 
 290. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
 291. See supra Part I.B.1. 
 292. See supra Part I.B.2. 
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which is inadequate software quality assurance on behalf of software 
manufacturers.  Thus, even if FISMA were perfectly implemented by 
federal agencies, actual cybersecurity would increase only minimally. 
This is not to say that FISMA cannot be reformed.  Requiring federal 
agencies to purchase software containing an express warranty, and not 
allowing software manufacturers to disclaim that warranty, could 
meaningfully increase federal cybersecurity.  Such an incentive scheme 
would improve federal cybersecurity with minimal cost to the federal 
government, and without most of the difficult implementation problems or 
ineffective, burdensome reporting requirements FISMA currently imposes.  
Additionally, such an incentive system would more reasonably balance the 
concerns of software manufacturers with the need for a liability-based 
incentive system.293 
The threat of national and economic catastrophe due to a cyberattack 
from a hostile state or individual actor is dramatically increasing.  
Cyberattacks can be used in place of nearly any traditional medium of 
attack or espionage.294  Oftentimes, cyberattacks are preferable to a 
traditional attack because of the ease with which cyberattacks may be 
executed, and the intrinsic difficulties associated with identifying actors 
responsible for an attack.295  Consequently, the threat of cyberattack poses 
the greatest threat to America’s critical infrastructure, military capabilities, 
and national sovereignty since the advent of weapons of mass destruction.  
The time is now for reform.  FISMA reforms that mandate a narrow, 
predictable express warranty would properly incentivize software 
manufacturers and meaningfully increase national and economic security. 
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